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MOLDING THE CORPORATE FORM TO PARTICULAR
BUSINESS SITUATIONS: OPTIONAL CHARTER CLAUSES
F. HODGE O'NEAL*

This paper looks into the usefulness of optional (or as they are
sometimes called, "permissive" or "special") charter provisions' in
molding the corporate form of business organization to meet the
diverse needs of particular business situations.2 It first examines
statutory materials and judicial decisions bearing on the validity and
effect of optional provisions. It then considers optional clauses in
current use and typical legal and business problems that optional
clauses may help to solve. It shows that optional clauses often can be
used to clarify the rights and other relations of participants in an
enterprise, to avoid disadvantageous corporate "norms," or to eliminate normal corporate attributes undesired in a particular enterprise.
Finally, it discusses measures that increase the effectiveness of optional clauses and protect them against circumvention.
STATUTORY AND CASE LAW BASES FOR OPTIONAL PROVISIONS
The lawyer preparing a corporate charter should try to find clear
statutory or judicial support for each clause he uses.3 He must study,
*Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; former Dean, Walter F. George
School of Law, Mercer University.
1. Corporation statutes list "mandatory" charter provisions, i.e., clauses
that must be inserted in the articles of incorporation, certificate of incorporation or basic incorporation paper, whatever it may be called in a particular
jurisdiction. Among the clauses which must be included in the charter are
some (the stock and financial clauses, for instance) which are "optional"
in the sense that the draftsman is not restricted to bare recitals of required
items but has a wide choice as to the wording and content of the clauses he
uses. The variations to which clauses of that kind are susceptible give the
draftsman considerable leeway in molding the structure of a corporation
to business needs. This paper, however, does not discuss clauses of that kind.
It deals solely with charter clauses on matters which the statute does not
require the draftsman to cover at all in the charter.
2. This subject is a relatively unexplored one. A good deal of law has
grown up around optional provisions, but the statutes and cases have not
been collected and analyzed with a view to providing a guide for practitioners
engaged in planning and drafting corporate charters. For brief but helpful
comments on optional clauses, see Aspey, Suggestions and Precautions in
Drafting Articles of Incorporation,in ORGANIZING AND ADVIsiNG SMALL BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES (Cal. Practice Hand Book No. 2) 162, 171-75 (1954); BALLENTINE

& STERLING, CALIFORNIA CoRPoRATIos LAWS §§ 35-39 (1949 ed.); IsRAELs AND

GoRmAN, CORPORATE PRACTICE, 55, 107-09 (1955 rev.). For a collection of
specimen clauses, see BALLENTINE & STERLING, op. cit. supra § 512.
3. Some cases have held that charter clauses "not responsive to some specifi-
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the entire corporation act, because statutory materials that bear on
the validity or effect of optional charter provisions may be scattered
4
throughout the act.

In many jurisdictions, authorization for the use of optional clauses
in the charter is set forth in the same section of the corporation act
that lists the mandatory charter provisions or in a section immediately
following the mandatory provisions section. Even in these jurisdictions, however, the draftsman cannot safely ignore other parts of the
act, because other sections may authorize additional optional clauses
or specify with greater particularity the nature or scope of the clauses
that may be used.5 Similarly, a general authorization of optional
charter clauses may be narrowed 6 by other provisions of the act.
The statutory materials that support the use of optional charter
clauses can be classified as follows:

7

(1)

statutes specifically naming

clauses (e.g., clauses limiting or denying shareholders' preemptive
rights) which may be included in the charter; (2) statutes stating
rules to apply in the absence of coverage in the charter or otherwise
indicating in a backhanded or indirect way that treatment of specified
matters in the charter is permissible; 8 (3) statutes authorizing in
cation in the law" will be disregarded as surplusage. See authorities discussed

pp. 19-20 infra, especially those in note 98. BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW
AND PRACTICE § 101 (rev. ed. 1953) refers to "dangerous consequences" which
might follow reliance upon an invalid charter provision but does not specify
what consequences he had in mind.
4. See e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 305, 803(b), 817, 1103(b), 1107, 1707 (c),
2214, 2466, 3033, 3600 (Deering 1953).
5. See, e.g., UNirOmW BusnEss CORPORATION ACT §§ 36(11), 31(111).
6. Consider, for example, the possible restrictive effect on KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-2803(F) (1949) (authorizing a charter provision reserving to the
corporation and existing shareholders the right to purchase and acquire the
stock of a selling stockholder before sale to outsiders) of KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-3004 (1949) (providing that a corporation may not purchase its
own stock except in the situations there specified). For another statutory
provision that may narrow the choice which at first sight appears to be given
to the draftsman by more general statutory sections, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 153(a) (1953). See also CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 3003 (Deering 1953)
(shareholders' right to inspect records cannot be limited by articles); CAL.
CORP. CODE ANN. § 2466 (Deering 1953) ("The provisions of this section
shall control although the charter or articles of incorporation . . . provide
that the shares represented thereby shall be transferable only on the books.
..."); Oino REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.58 (Baldwin 1953) ("Such right to vote
cumulatively shall not be restricted or qualified by the articles or the code
of regulations").
7. See 1 FLETCHER, CORPORATION FORMS ANNOTATED § 179 (3d and rev. ed.,
Nichols 1938).
8. The wording of these statutes varies widely. Many statutes state the
norm that is to apply "unless otherwise provided in the articles or by-laws."
A few other examples of the statutory language follow: CAL, CORP. CODE ANN.
§ 805 (Deering 1953) (directors shall hold office until the next annual meeting
"unless the articles provide for a shorter time"); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §
1103 (Deering 1953) ("subject to any limitations or restrictions contained in
the articles"); CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1107 (Deering 1953) (a corporation
may, "uuon such terms and conditions as the articles or by-laws may
authorize," provide and carry out an employee stock purchase plan); N.Y.
STOCK CORP. LAW § 5(12) (if meetings of the board of directors "are to be
held only within the state the certificate or by-laws must so provide");
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broad, vague terms the use of whatever lawful clauses the incorporators may choose to insert to regulate the conduct of corporate affairs
or to define the powers of the corporation, the shareholders or the
directors; 9 and (4) statutes stating that any provisions may be inserted
in the charter which are authorized for inclusion in the by-laws.'0
Statutes of the first two types seldom present problems for the
draftsman. Most of them indicate with reasonable clarity the nature
and permissible scope of the particular charter provisions that they
authorize. These two types of statutes are discussed together in this
paper under the heading "Statutes Authorizing Specific Provisions,"
and the discussion is limited to a rather brief enumeration of the
clauses for which specific authority is to be found in the statutes. The
broad, vague language of statutes of the third type raises many questions of interpretation. Those statutes and the judicial decisions applying or interpreting them are examined in some detail under the heading "Broadly Worded Statutes and Decisions Interpreting Them." The
fourth type of statute obviously calls for an inquiry into what matters
are within the purview of the by-laws. This paper does not go into
that question."
A. Statutes Authorizing Specific Provisions.
The number and kinds of optional clauses that are specifically
authorized by statute vary tremendously from state to state; in most
jurisdictions, however, only two or three clauses, if that many, are
thus authorized. 12 Perhaps the charter clause for which express statutory support can be found in the greatest number of jurisdictions is
one "limiting or denying" shareholders' preemptive rights to subscribe to new issues of stock. 13 Other optional clauses which are
expressly and specifically authorized in a considerable number of
Wyo. CoM. STAT. ANi. § 44-117 (1945) ("the directors, if the certificate
incorporation so provides, shall have power to make by-laws").

of

9. Statutes of this kind are discussed pp. 5-19 infra.

10. See, e.g., MD.ANN. CODE art. 23, § 4(c) (1951).
11. For considerations to keep in mind in deciding whether to place a
particular provision in the charter or the by-laws, see pp. 46-51 infra.
12. A few corporation statutes, however, specifically authorize a rather
large number of optional clauses. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1707-47,
1701.48 (c), 1701.63, 1701.65, 1701.67, 1701.68 (Baldwin 1953).
13. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (3) (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§17-2803(D) (1949); MVnNr. STAT. ANN. § 301.04(9) (Supp. 1955); NEB. REV.
§ 21-106 (1943); ORE(. REv. STAT. § 57.311 (1953); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
3018(i) (1955). See also LA. REV. STAT. § 12-3(B)(1) (1950) ("enlarging,
limiting or denying"); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 26 (1951) (preemptive rights
may be "defined, limited or denied"). 'The articles . . . may provide that
STAT.

the shareholders shall have no pre-emptive right to subscribe for any addi"tional shares of capital stock or other obligations convertible into shares
to be issued by the corporation or may provide any restrictions or limitations on such rights as may be desired." McH.CoMp. LAWS § 450.31 (1948). On
the other hand the statutes in some states authorize ontional charter provisions "granting" preemptive rights. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 305(b)
(Deering 1953); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-204(11).
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jurisdictions include: restrictions on the transferability of stock, 14
provisions requiring for director action a greater than majority vote
or requiring for shareholder action the vote of larger proportion of
the stock or of any class of stock than would otherwise be necessary, 15
provisions setting high quorum requirements for shareholders' and
directors' meetings, 16 provisions (set forth verbatim in the statute)
relating to compromises and arrangements,1 7 and clauses conferring on
directors the power to make by-laws. 18
Section 9 of the New York Stock Corporation Law 19 is perhaps the
best known of the statutory provisions specifically authorizing use
of a particular kind of special charter clause. That statute provides
that (subject to compliance with specified requirements of consent by
shareholders) the certificate of incorporation can impose high quorum
requirements for shareholders' meetings and for directors' meetings,
and can require unanimity or a vote greater than a majority for share20
holder and director action.
Other optional provisions which are expressly authorized in one
or more jurisdictions are as follows: clauses vesting in the board of
directors authority to establish series of shares and to fix the variations
in the relative rights and preferences as between series,2 1 clauses
providing that a particular class or classes of shares or securities may
14. E.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2804(F) (1949) (provision reserving to
the corporation and existing shareholders the right to purchase and acquire the
stock of a selling stockholder before sale to a non-stockholder); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, § 6 (1951); R. I. Gen. Laws 1938, c. 116, art. I, § 7 (charter clauses
providing that the corporation shall have a lien on the shares of a holder for
assessments due from him or for other indebtedness due the corporation, or
that the corporation shall have the right on the sale of stock by any holder
to purchase the stock at the lowest price at which the holder is willing to
sell before it is offered to any other purchaser).
15. E.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 817 (Deering 1953); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(4) (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2803(G) (1949); NED. REv.
STAT. § 21-106 (1934); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.55 (Baldwin 1953); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 3018(i) (1955). For a discussion of these and similar statutory
materials see O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions:
Use of Special Charterand By-Law Provisions, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 451,
457-59 (1953).
16. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 351.265, 351.325 (1949); N.Y. STOCK Corn'.
LAW § 9; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.67 (Baldwin 1953); ORE. REv. STAT. §§
57.165, 57.200 (1953); Wis. STAT. §§ 180.28, 180.35 (1955).
17. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (2) (1953); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-2803(C) (1949); MICH. Comp. LAWS § 450.4(3) (1948); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3018(h) (1949).
18. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13-10 (1950); UNIFORM BUSINESS CORPORATIONS
ACT § 26(11); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 44-117 (1945). See also KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-2803(H) (1949) (authorizing a charter clause setting forth
the manner of adopting, altering and repealing by-laws).
19. N.Y. STOCK CORP.LAW § 9.
20. Section 9 originally limited the effectiveness of charter provisions of this.
kind to ten years, after which they could be renewed for one or more ten
year periods. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 717 § 1, which amends Section 9, apparently permits clauses effective for an unlimited period of time.
21. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 32, § 157.47 (Smith-Hurd 1954). See also
KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2802(f) (1949).
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elect a specified number or proportion of the directors,2 statements
that directors must be residents of the state of incorporation or shareholders in the corporation, 23 provisions that only directors elected
by the vote of a particular class or classes or shares or securities may
elect all or designated officers,A statements fixing the terms of the
directors at less than one year,2 provisions authorizing any director
or shareholder to vote for an absent director in accordance with the
latter's written instructions, 26 provisions setting forth the method and
conditions upon which members shall be accepted, discharged or
expelled, 27 clauses granting power to levy assessments upon shares, 28
provisions that no shareholder shall own or vote more than a specified
percentage of the corporation's stock, 9 clauses setting up an employee
stock purchase plan,30 provisions denying or limiting the power of
the board of directors to fix a time in the future as record date for
determining shareholders of record entitled to vote or to an allotment
or distribution,31 provisions limiting the power of the corporation to
purchase its shares from earned surplus, 32 provisions fixing the consideration for which no-par shares may be issued by the incorporators,33 provisions setting the valuation of consideration to be received
for shares, 34 and provisions that the corporation may pay dividends
from the net profits arising from wasting assets without deducting for
depreciation or depletion. 35
B. Broadly Worded Statutes and Decisions Interpreting Them.
The draftsman will usually find that some of the optional clauses
he wants to use are not referred to individually or specifically in the
corporation statute. In most states, as has been mentioned,36 only two
or three clauses receive specific statutory sanction; and generally the
clauses specifically authorized are not the ones most often used. Thus,
the draftsman frequently has to look to broadly worded statutory
22. LA. REV. STAT. § 12:34 (1950).

23. ILL. Aim. STAT. c. 32, § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd 1954). See also CAL. CORP.
CODE ANN. § 804 (Deering 1953).
24. LA. REv. STAT. § 12:34(D) (1950).
25. CAL. CORP.CODE ANN. § 805 (Deering 1953).

26. LA. REv. STAT. § 12:35(F) (1950).

27. Wis. STAT. § 180.02(g) (1947). This provision omitted from 1955 Code.
See WIs. STAT. 180.45 (1955).
28. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 305 (Deering 1953). See also KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-2803 (A) (1949).
29. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2803(E) (1949). See also UNiFoam BusiNEss
CoRpoIATIoN ACT § 28(I) ("Except as otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation, every shareholder of record shall have the right . . . to one
vote for every share standing in his name on the books of the corporation").
30. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN.§ 1107 (Deering 1953).
31. CAL. CORP.CODE ANN.§ 2214 (Deering 1953).
32. CAL. CORP.CODE ANN.§ 1707(c) (Deering 1953).
33. Oio REv. CODE ANN.. 1701.06 (f) (Baldwin 1953).
34. Omo REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.06 (g) (Baldwin 1953).
35. LA. REV. STAT. § 12:3(C) (1950).

36. See p. 3 supra.
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materials for support for clauses that he wants to insert in the charter.
(1) The Statutes.-Most corporation statutes contain a section
which in broad terms authorizes the use of optional provisions in the
charter.37 Some statutes list the required contents of the charter and
then simply add a statement that the charter may contain "any provisions not inconsistent with law, which the incorporators may choose
'38
to insert for the regulation of the internal affairs of the corporation,
or a statement something to that effect. 39 The section in the Delaware
statute,40 which has substantially identical or very similar counterparts in a number of jurisdictions, 4 1 is somewhat more lengthy. It
states that the charter may contain:
37. The corporation laws of a number of states have contained since the
beginning of this century a section broadly authorizing the use of optional
charter provisions. See, e.g., Ala. Gen. Acts 1903, act 395, § 2(j); N.Y. Sess.

Laws 1895, c. 672, § 10; N.C. Pub. Laws 1901, c. 2, § 8 (7); Va. Acts of Assembly
Extra Session 1902-1904, c. 270, at 437. The National Banking Act of 1864
contained a section of this kind. See Bullard v. Bank, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
589 (1874). One of the reasons for enacting these statutes authorizing optional
charter provisions was to enable persons entering closely held corporations
as minority shareholders to protect themselves by insisting on appropriate
charter clauses against increases in capital stock, increases in the number
of directors, consolidations and other changes in the structure or management
of the corporation which might adversely affect their rights. "It was to enable
parties to incorporate without being subject to these dangers that the statute
of 1895 was enacted to permit the parties in interest, by their original agreement of incorporation, to limit their respective rights and powers in respects
that did not affect the public." Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205
N.Y. 442, 98 N.E. 855, 856-57 (1912). The applicability of the statutes, however, was not confined to closely held corporations.
38. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-204(12). See also ILL. ANN.STAT. c. 32,
§ 157.47 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
39. See ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2(10) (1940); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5153
1949). MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 156, § 6 (1948), after setting forth the clauses
which the agreement of association must have, adds that it may contain any
other "lawful provision for the conduct and regulation of the business of
the corporation, for its voluntary dissolution, or for limiting, defining or regulating the powers of the corporation, or of its directors or stockholders, or of
any class of stockholders." See also R. I. GEN. LAWS 1938, c. 116, art. I, § 8
(very similar to Massachusetts statute but substitutes "provisions not inconsistent with law" for "lawful provisions" and omits "for its voluntary dissolution").
The language of some statutes is perhaps even broader and more inclusive. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 351.055 (1949) (provisions "not inconsistent with law, which the incorporators may choose to insert"); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 16-2-5(12) (1953) ("such additional clauses as the incorporators
deem necessary for conducting the business of the corporation and for its
future safety and welfare"); Wis. STAT. § 180.45(2) (1955) ("include additional provisions, not inconsistent with law, including any provision which
under this chapter is required or permitted to be set forth in the by-laws.")
40. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (1) (1953).
41. See ARK. STAT. ANN. 64-101 (i) (1947) (identical with the Delaware
provision except that "for the regulation of the business" is used in lieu of
"for the management of the business" and "dividing" is used in lieu of
"defining"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.03 (Supn. 1955) (same as the Arkansas
statute except that the proviso is eliminated and the .following substituted:
"including. but not limited to. a list of officers, and provisions governing the
issuance of stock certificates to replace lost or destroyed stock certificates");
GA. CODS ANN. § 22-1802(h) (Sunp. 1951) (varying in a number of respects
from the Delaware section. including the addition of the clause "and creating,
defining or limiting the preferences or rights given to any particular class
of the stock"); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 4 17-2803(B) (1949) (identical with
Delaware statute); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 4(b) (9) (1951) ("any provision
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Any provision which the incorporators may choose to insert for the
management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the
corporation, and any provisions creating, defining, limiting and regulating
the powers of the corporation, the directors and the stockholders, or any
class of the stockholders, or, in the case of a corporation which is to have
no capital stock, of the members of such corporation; provided, such
provisions are not contrary to the laws of this state.
Just exactly what optional charter provisions are sanctioned by
these broadly worded statutes is difficult to determine.4 The few
judicial decisions that have interpreted these statutes are not entirely
in accord, and a number of the decisions invalidate charter clauses
that the broad, general language of the statutes (at least if taken
literally) clearly seems to authorize. Further, the facts that the
statutes vary somewhat from state to state weakens the authority of
these decisions in other jurisdictions; and even under identical statutes
differences in other parts of the corporation law or in judicial conceptions of what constitutes an appropriate corporate structure may lead
to disparate results.
As the statutes vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and as many
not inconsistent with law, which may be desired for the purpose of defining,
limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation and of the directors
and stockholders, or of any class of stockholders, and of holders of any
bonds, notes or other securities which the corporation may issue"); MIcH.
Comp. LAws § 450.4(2) (1948) (deviates from language of Delaware section
considerably and in addition gives authority for provisions "for the purpose
of creating and defining rights and privileges of the shareholders among
themselves."); N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:2-3 (1937) (any provision, "consistent
with law, which the incorporators may choose to insert, for the management
of the business and the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any
provision creating, defining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, its directors and stockholders or any class of stockholders."); W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 3018(g) (1955) (identical with Delaware section except that
"provided" is capitalized and is preceded by a colon rather than a semi-colon.
N.Y. GEm CORP. LAW § 13(2) provides that the certificate of incorporation of
a corporation may contain "any provision for the regulation of its business and
the conduct of its affairs, and any limitation upon its powers, or upon the
rights of its stockholders or upon the powers of its directors and members,
which does not exempt them from the performance of any obligation or
duty imposed by law."
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.06 (Baldwin 1953) provides that the articles of
incorporation shall set forth
"(H) Any lawful provisions which may be desired for the purpose of
defining, limiting, and regulating the exercise of the authority of the
corporation, of the directors, or of all of the share-holders; any provision
which may be made in the code of regulations of a corporation may be
made in its articles;
"(I) Such additional provisions permitted by sections 1701.01 to 1702.43,
inclusive, of the Revised Code, as may be desired."
The statutory sections referred to in (I) take in the whole of the Ohio general
corporation statute. Note also that (H) and (I) are cumulative.
42. Some authors caution against a too ready reliance on these statutes for
support of charter clauses. See BALLANTINE, CoaPoRATioNs § 16 (rev. ed. 1946);
BALLANTINE AND STERNra,

CALIFORNIA CoRPoRATIoN LAWS

§

37 (1949 ed.)

Professor Ballantine may have been influenced in his views by the language
of the California statute, which is somewhat narrower than that of statutes
in many jurisdictions.
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of the decisions interpreting them are questionable or are based in
part at least on other statutory materials, each decision must be considered individually and in some detail to determine what weight
to give it in another jurisdiction.
This paper now discusses decisions relating to the scope of the
authorization (i.e., determining what charter clauses are included
within the coverage of the statute), the New York cases of this kind
being grouped and discussed separately from the others. It then considers the cases interpreting provisos and other language in the
statutes wlhich except from the broad authorization charter provisions
contrary to law.
(2) The Cases Outside New York.-Perhaps the first decision to
construe one of these general statutes was Bullard v. The National
Eagle Bank.43 In that case, the United States Supreme Court had before
it a section of the National Banking Act of 186444 which provided that
articles of association of national banks might contain any provisions
"not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, which the Association
may see fit to adopt for the regulation of the business of the Association and the conduct of its affairs." The court held that this statutory
provision did not authorize a clause in the bank's articles of association
giving the directors power to make by-laws prohibiting the transfer
of stock owned by a holder indebted to the bank. This charter clause,
the Court stated, "ought not to be considered as a regulation of the
business of the Bank or a regulation for the conduct of its affairs. '45
The Court, however, seemed to base its decision principally on Congress' repeal of an earlier statutory provision which had stated that
shareholders indebted to a national bank could not transfer their stock,
the Court reasoning that this repeal manifested intention to withhold
from banks a lien on stock of their debtors.
The next decision was Audenried v. East Coast Milling Co.,46 which
interpreted the following New Jersey statute:
The certificate of incorporation may also contain any provision which
the incorporators may choose to insert for the regulation of the business,
and for the conduct of the affairs of the corporation; and any provision
creating, defining, limiting or regulating the powers of the corporation, of
the directors, or of the stockholders, or of any class or classes of stockholders; provided, such provision be not inconsistent with this act.
The New Jersey court held that this broad statute did not authorize
a charter provision that written resolutions signed by all directors
would constitute board action, just as though they were passed at a
43.
44.
45.
46.

85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 589 (1874).
13 STAT. 100 (1864).
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 596.
68 N.J. Eq. 450, 59 AtI. 577 (Ch. 1904).
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regularly called board meeting. Focusing on that part of the statute
authorizing charter provisions "creating, defining, limiting, and regulating" the powers of the directors, the court drew a distinction between "creating" powers in the directors and setting up a procedure
for exercising those powers. The legislature granted the right to create
powers in the directors by special charter provision, said the court, not
the "right to authorize the directors to exercise the powers thus
established according to any method the incorporators may see fit to
adopt." 47 The court further pointed out that other sections of the
corporation statute stated that "the business of every corporation shall
be managed by its board of directors" and that votes by the directors
shall be recorded by the secretary in a book kept for that purpose, and
reasoned that these statutory provisions (which it treated as mandatory norms) and common law concepts requiring directors to act as a
board at deliberative meetings precluded charter authorization of
separate action by the directors.
A Virginia act, identical with the New Jersey statute just discussed,
was interpreted much more liberally. In Union Trust Co. of Maryland
v. Carter,48 a federal circuit court upheld a charter clause vesting in
the board of directors entire control of the corporation for a period
of approximately five and one-half years, and depriving shareholders
of the right to vote or in any way participate in management during
that period.49 The effect the court gave norms in other parts of the
corporation act was entirely different from that given in the Audenried
case. It treated other sections of the act, such as those providing for
annual meetings of the shareholders, for shareholder meetings at any
time on call of ten percent of the shares, and for the board of directors
to be under the direction of the shareholders, as applicable only to
companies without charter provisions to the contrary.
In News-Register Co. v. Rockingham Pub. Co.,50 Virginia's Supreme
Court of Appeals found the statute adequate support for a charter
amendment empowering the corporation to enter into a contract of
partnership. 51 The Virginia court, taking a view of the statute entirely
different from that of the Audenried court, commented that it seemed
"to clear for argument that the words, 'creating and defining,' as used
in the statute are amply broad to provide for authority in the charter
47. 68 N.J. Eq. 450, 59 Atl. 577, 584 (Ch. 1904).
48. 139 Fed. 717 (CC.W.D. Va. 1905).
49. Statements to this effect were also placed in the subscription contracts
and on the share certificates. For a discussion'of the desirability of referring
on the share certificates to unusual charter provisions, see p. 52 infra.
50. 118 Va. 140, 86 S.E. 874 (1915).
51. The court stated, "If support be needed for this conclusion it is found in
the construction placed upon the same provision in New Jersey by the textwriters and courts of that state." 86 S.E. at 877. Apparently the Audenried
case was not brought to the court's attention.
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of any private business corporation.., to do any act not unlawful in
itself and not prohibited by the statute. ' 52
(3) The New York Cases.-A number of decisions have interpreted
and applied the New York statute, but taken together they do little to
clarify its meaning. The first New York case was People ex rel. Barney
v. Whalen.53 At that time, the pertinent part of the New York statute
read as follows: 5
The certificate may contain any other provision for the regulation of
the business and the conduct of the affairs of the corporation and any
limitation upon its powers and upon the powers of its directors and
stockholders which does not exempt them from any obligation or from
the performance of any duty imposed by law.
The Appellate Division held that this section did not sanction a charter
clause empowering the directors, with the consent of holders of twothirds of the stock, to dispose of all corporate property except franchises. The court concluded that the charter clause did not regulate
the business or relate to the conduct of the affairs of the corporation
within the meaning of the statute but on the contrary was one "for
the purpose of ending or closing up its business or affairs," 55 and that
the clause did not limit the powers of the corporation or its directors
and shareholders but instead enlarged those powers.
The statute came before the New York Court of Appeals in Ripin v.
United States Woven Label Co.56 On the basis of the statute, the court
in that case upheld as valid and binding a provision in the certificate of
incorporation that the number of directors fixed in the certificate could
only be changed by unanimous shareholder consent. The court was not
daunted by another section of the statute which stated that the
number of directors in a corporation may be increased or reduced by
the holders of a majority of the shares. Statutory rules of that kind,
the court said, prescribe details of internal management intended to
prevail in the absence of agreement to the contrary; they do not involve public policy and therefore can be modified by charter provisions. The court observed that the statute authorizing optional charter provisions would be of little or no efficacy unless it were interpreted
to allow the incorporators to set regulations for the conduct of corporate affairs and limitations on the powers of the corporation and its
52. 86 S.E. at 877.
53. 119 App. Div. 749, 104 N.Y. Supp. 434 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem., 189
N.Y.560, 82 N.E.1131 (1907).
54. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1892, p. 2042, c.691, as amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws
1895, p. 445, c.671, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1896, p. 314, c.369, § 1,Id. p. 428, c.
460, and N.Y. Sess. Laws 1901, p. 1279, c.520. Substantially the same provision was also contained inthe New York General Corporation Law. N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1892, p.1804, c.687, as amended by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1895, p.449, c.
672.
55. 104 N.Y.Supp.at 556.
56. 205 N.Y.442, 98 N.E.855 (1912).
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members different from those prescribed by the various sections of the
5
corporation act.

7

The Whalen case was distinguished by pointing out that the charter
clause in that case increased (rather than limited) the powers of the
corporation and its directors and that therefore the provision there
was clearly not supported by a statute which authorizes only "limitations" on the powers of the corporation or its directors or shareholders. 58 This distinction greatly weakens the Whalen case as an
authority in other jurisdictions, because the statutes of most states
expressly authorize charter provisions "creating, defining and regulating" (as well as "limiting") the powers of the corporation, directors or
59
shareholders.
Earlier cases holding by-laws invalid as in conflict with rules laid
down in the corporation act were distinguished in the Ripin case on
the ground that the statutory grant to corporations of power to enact
by-laws was restricted to by-laws "not inconsistent with any existing
law." This restriction on by-laws apparently was considered to be
broader and more inclusive than the limitation on charter provisions,
which (it will be recalled) restricts approval to those clauses which
57. 98 N.E. at 856. The privilege would certainly be of little value if the
court filled whatever "gaps" there might be in the statutes by "reading into"
them common law concepts and rules. See Audenried v. East Coast Milling
Co., 68 N.J. Eq. 450, 59 AtL 577 (Ch. 1904), discussed p. 8 supra. "The powers
of the directors are conferred to enable the business of the corporation to be
transacted in the interest of and for the profit of the stockholders. If the
stockholders by charter or by by-law deem any limitation desirable there
seems never to have been any reason for denying such right to them. But
all doubt upon that score is set at rest by the provision of Section 10, subdivision 2, of the General Corporation Law [authorizing optional charter
clauses] ... [and] by Section 11, subdivision 5 [providing that duly adopted
by-laws shall control the action of the directors]." Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.
v. Pierson, 222 N.Y. Supp. 532, 546-47 (Sup. Ct. 1927). In People ex rel.
Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (1911) the court indicated
that "reasonable and lawful" charter provisions authorizing the suspension
or removal of a director would be given effect. At about this same time,
however, the Attorney General of New York ruled a number of charter provisions invalid. Ops. ATT'Y GEN. 600 (N.Y. 1911) held that the Department of
State did not have to file a certificate of incorporation which contained a
clause requiring the shareholders of the corporation to sell to it all milk
produced on their farms. "This," the Attorney General said, "is neither the
regulation of the business of the corporation nor related to the conduct of
its affairs. It is not a limitation of the powers of the stockholders, but it is
ina sense a restraint upon the freedom to contract for the sale of their milk.
Under no circumstances can I see any reason for its insertion in the charter."
Ops. ATT'y GEN. 238 (N.Y. 1912) declared invalid provisions in a certificate of
incorporation which gave corporate creditors (1) the right to determine
whether premises owned by the corporation should be sold, mortgaged or

otherwise disposed of or encumbered, and (2) the right to determine whether
the business of the corporation should be discontinued and its affairs
liquidated.
58. 98 N.E. at 857. That the statute permitted charter limitations on the
powers of the corporation and its directors or shareholders but not clauses
creating or defining those powers is probably attributable to the fear which
once prevailed that corporations might gain too much power if given free
scoe.

59. See pp. 6-7 supra.
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do not exempt directors or shareholders from "any obligation or from
the performance of any duty imposed by law." 60 In many jurisdictions,
the statutory section authorizing optional charter clauses contains
language similar to that used in the New York by-law limitation. In
those states, the Ripin case might be persuasive authority against
rather than in favor of the validity of a charter clause requiring shareholder unanimity to change the number of directors fixed in the certificate.
In re Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co.61 held invalid a charter provision which required unanimous consent of shareholders to elect
directors. The Appellate Division said that the provision violated a
section of the corporation act which declared that directors of "every
stock corporation shall be chosen" by a plurality of shareholder votes.
In holding that the section was mandatory, the court relied heavily on
cases invalidating by-laws departing from the norm set by this statute.
The Ripin case, which (it will be recalled) refused to extend decisions
invalidating by-laws to charter provisions, was distinguished on the
ground that the statutory section departed from by the charter clause
in the Ripin case was permissive (providing that the number of directors "may" be increased or reduced when the shareholders so determine) while the section breached in the Boulevard Theatre &
Realty Co. case was couched in imperative language.
A number of comments can be made on In re Boulevard Theatre &
Realty Co. First, the court there invalidated a charter provision that
did not exempt the directors or shareholders from the performance
of any "obligation" or "duty" imposed by law, at least not in the ordinary meaning of those terms. The charter provision there (like the
one in the Ripin case) can better be described as limiting a "power"
of the shareholders. Thus the court in effect read into the optional
charter provision section of the New York law a limitation or proviso
expressly stated in the statutes of many jurisdictions, namely, that
charter clauses cannot depart from norms laid down in other sections
of the corporation act. Further, the court seemed to be of the opinion
that a charter provision is invalid if it is inconsistent with a common
law rule, particularly if the common law rule is "reinforced" by
statute.62 Finally, after noting that many shareholders had submitted
affidavits that until this controversy arose they were unaware of the
existence of the special charter provision, the court intimated that a
charter provision could be held invalid as contrary to public policy,
60. The Appellate Division clearly indicated that it considered the charter
clause in the Ripin case only limited a power of the shareholders and did not
exempt them from the performance of any of their duties. 145 App. Div.
916, 130 N.Y. Supp. 20, 21 (1st Dep't 1911).
61. 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N.Y. Supp. 430 (1st Dep't), af'd mem., 231 N.Y.
615, 132 N.E. 910 (1921).
62. 118 N.Y.Supp.at 433.
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at least if the effect of the provision was "to work a fraud upon the
public." 63 That the court was influenced by the fact that some of the
shareholders were not aware of the charter clause certainly indicates
the desirability of referring to unorthodox charter clauses on the share
certificates.
Albrect, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, Inc.64 added further

confusion. In that case, a charter amendment cutting off the preemptive right of shareholders to purchase new issues of stock was approved by the holders of more than two-thirds of the shares. The
court held that in view of the statute authorizing optional charter
clauses,65 the certificate of incorporation could be amended to dprive
consenting shareholders of preemptive rights but that the amendment
would not be effective against shareholders who voted against its
adoption. 66 Thus, a charter amendment, approved by the required
shareholders vote, was given effect as to some shareholders but not as
to others. This case certainly points up the desirability of getting unanimous consent to the inclusion of optional provisions in the charter, particularly if they are of an uncommon kind, and of making certain that
shareholders who come into the corporation later are aware of the
67
provisions and consent to be bound by them.
(4) Statutory Language Limiting Authorization to "Legal" Clauses.
-Most of the broad statutes authorizing optional charter clauses limit
the authorization to "lawful" provisions, to provisions "consistent
with the laws of this state," or to provisions which do not exempt the
directors or shareholders "from the performance of any obligation or
duty imposed by law."68 The California law contains a sort of double
requirement of legality. That statute69 provides that the charter may
include any desired clauses imposing "any limitations and requirements authorized by this division, and otherwise regulating the busi63. Ibid.

64. 256 App. Div. 134, 9 N.Y.S.2d 415 (4th Dep't), aff'd mem., 280 N.Y. 840,
21 N.E.2d 887 (1939).
65. By the time of this case that statute was designated (as it is at present):
N.Y. GEN.CORP. LAW § 13 (2).

66. The court did not indicate whether the amendment would be effective
against shareholders who were not represented at the meeting or who were
present or represented but did not vote.
67. See p. 44 infra.
68. In some of the statutes, this limitation is in the form of a "proviso."
See, e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2 (1940); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-2803 (B)

(1949). Usually the limiting language, whether it be in the form of a restric-

tive adjective or adjectives or in the form of a proviso, applies to the whole
statutory section. See e.g., LA. REv. STAT. § 12:3 (2), (3) (1950). In a few
statutes, there is some doubt whether the limiting language applies to all
clauses of the section. See, e.g., GA. CODE AN. § 22-1802 (Supp. 1951); VA.
CODE ANx. § 13-24(9) (1950). One or two statutes do not contain a limitation.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE AN. § 16-2-5(12) (1953). Does a statute without a
limitation authorize charter clauses which would not be approved under
statutes with a limitation? If so, what types of charter clauses?
69. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 305 (c) (Deering 1953).
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ness and affairs of the corporation and the powers of the directors and
shareholders in a manner not in conflict with law." 0
These vague requirements of "lawfulness" invite attack on an unorthodox optional charter clause on the theory that it is contrary
to a section of the corporation act or some other statute,71 is inconsistent with the statutorily established scheme of corporate organization, or is violative of some perhaps obscure public policy.
The question most often raised is whether a charter clause is inconsistent with a section of the corporation statute. The statutory
section invoked to challenge a charter provision is usually a so-called
"norm." It might state, for example, that the corporation shall be
managed by the board of directors, that corporate officers shall be
selected by the board of directors, or that specified corporate action
can be taken on a designated percentage vote of the directors or
shareholders. If variation from the norm by charter provision is not
clearly authorized by the section containing the norm or by some
other part of the corporation statute, a court is confronted by a difficult
problem of statutory construction, really by a double problem of interpretation. First, the court should determine whether the statutory rule
was meant to be definitive or was merely intended to govern in the
absence of other arrangement among the participants. If the court
concludes that the participants as a general proposition are not privileged to depart from the rule (say, in a shareholder's agreement, or
in the by-laws), then it should decide whether the broad statutory
section authorizing optional charter provisions nevertheless permits
departures from the norm by this specifically approved method,
namely, the insertion of optional clauses in the charter.
The courts have not followed this somewhat refined approach. They
simply classified a provision of the corporation statute as "mandatory"
or "directory," and if they concluded that the provision is mandatory,
they invalidate charter clauses that deviate from it. That the corporation statute also contains a section broadly authorizing optional charter
provisions does not change the result. In only one decision72 has a
court indicated that this broad authorization of optional charter
clauses would support a clause deviating from a statutory norm which
otherwise might be interpreted as mandatory. Numerous decisions
have invalidated a charter clause on the ground that it contravened
73
a mandatory statute.
70. Italics supplied.
71. A charter provision that violates the state constitution is of course
void. Van Pelt v. Gardner, 54 Neb. 701, 75 N.W. 874 (1898).
72. Ripin v. U. S. Woven Label Co. 205 N.Y. 442, 98 N.E. 855, 856-57 (1912).
In this case, the court on the basis of the general statutory provision authorizing optional charter provisions sustained a clause which it indicated it probably would have invalidated as a by-law.
73. The following cases have held statutory sections to be mandatory and
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Some courts have expressed great indignation at a charter departure
from a statutory norm, condemning it as a "fraud on the statute"7 4 or
as "subversive of the statute."75 However, they seldom state what
harm they think may result from the deviating charter clause. A few
courts seem to have vague fears of encouraging some sort of corporate
excesses if organizers are given much freedom in framing charters. A
rather important objection was raised in In re Boulevard Theatre &
Realty Co.7 6 There the court declared that to sustain a charter prohave invalidated charter clauses which the courts considered inconsistent:
State ex Tel. Ross v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 67 N.E. 2M7 (1903)

(a charter

provision naming permanent directors held obnoxious to statute making directors elective each year); In re Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App.

Div. 518, 186 N.Y. Supp. 430 (1st Dep't 1921) (charter provision requiring
unanimous shareholder vote for election of directors held inconsistent with
statute calling for a plurality); People ex rel Barney v. Whalen, 119 App.
Div. 749, 104 N.Y. Supp. 555 (3d Dep't), aFf'd mem., 189 N.Y. 560, 82 N.E.
1131 (1907) (charter clause giving the directors authority, with the consent of
the holders of two-thirds of the capital stock, to dispose of all corporate
property except its franchises held to contravene statute restricting sale to
a foreign corporation); Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944)
(charter clause providing that no act of the directors shall be valid unless
approved by a unanimous vote of the directors held invalid, the court apparently believing it inconsistent with a number of statutory sections including one providing that every corporation shall be managed by a board
of directors); State ex rel. Badger Tel. Co. v. Rosenow, 174 Wis. 9, 182 N.W.
324 (1921) (charter clause providing for election of officers by the shareholders is inconsistent with statute stating that they shall be chosen by the
directors). The extent to which a court will sometimes go in finding a
mandatory norm is pointed up by the following language from the opinion in
State ex rel. Ross v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 67 N.E. 207, 210 (1903):
"The statute expressly requires that the certificate shall state the number and
names of the directors to manage the affairs of the company for the first
year. A statement of the names of the directors to manage the affairs
of the company always is, of course, in plain disagreement with this statutory requirement."
The following cases declare statutory rules to be directory or so construe
statutory language as to avoid conflict: Union Trust Co. v. Carter, 139 Fed.
717(C.C.W.D. Va. 1905) (charter clause providing that shareholders would
not vote or participate in the control of the corporation for a period of six
years during which time the entire management and control would be vested
in the directors was upheld notwithstanding statute providing for annual meetings of the shareholders); Orme v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 25
Ariz. 324, 217 Pac. 935 (1923); Lehmaier v. Bedford. 99 Conn. 468, 121 Atl. 810
(1923) (statute declaring that a majority of the directors shall constitute a
quorum held '"merely directory" and not to invalidate a charter provision
classifying directors and providing that less than a majority would constitute
a quorum); Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph Co., 11 Del. Ch. 190, 98 Atl. 943
(Ch. 1916), rev'd 11 Del. Ch. 412, 102 Atl. 988 (SuD. Ct. 1918) (charter provision permitting shareholders and directors to hold meetings outside of
Delaware not in conflict with statute providing that meetings may be held outside of the state if the by-laws so provide); Ripen v. Jacobs, 205 N.Y. 442, 98 N.E.
855 (1912) (charter clause providing that the number of directors fixed in the
charter should not be changed except by the unanimous consent of the
shareholders was sustained against contention that it contravened statute which
set up a method for increasing or reducing the number of directors; the
court referred to the statute as being "merely nermissive").
74. Leviton v. North Jersey Holding Co., 106 N.J. Eq. 517, 520, 151 Atl. 389,
390 (ch. 1930).
75. Clausen v. Leary, 133 N.J. Eq. 324, 329. 166 Atl. 623, 625 (ch. 1933).
76. 195 App. Div. 518. 186 N.Y.S. 430 (1st dep't), ajfd mer., 231 N.Y. 615,
132 N.E. 910 (1921). "Future shareholders, the persons who contribute the
capital and are chiefly concerned, have no voice in drafting the articles which
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vision requiring unanimous shareholder consent to elect directors
would work a fraud on purchasers unaware of the provision.
The word "lawful" and other limiting language used in the broad
statutes does not refer solely to statute law; the limitation is broader
than that. Under the Delaware statute, authorizing charter clauses
"not contrary to the law" of the state, the word "law" has been held to
embrace some common law principles. 7 As a matter of fact, in some
states the limiting language of these statutes has been seized upon to
declare invalid charter provisions considered to be inherently forbidden by the nature of the structure and operation of a corporation
or in some way contrary to public policy.78 In condemning a charter
provision, a court may declare that it is contrary to common law,
public policy, and the statutes of the state, all three;7 9 or it may state
that it violates a common law rule "re-enforced as it is by statute"
and also works a fraud upon the public.80
Another approach the courts sometimes take is to read into a statutory rule certain common law concepts and then hold the rule thus
broadened voids the charter provision. Thus, in Audenried v. East
Coast Milling Co.,81 the court read into a statute providing that the
business of every corporation shall be managed by its directors the
common law principle that directors must act as a board and not
separately, and struck down a charter provision that resolutions in
writing signed by all members of the board constituted board action.
Yet the word "laws" and other language of similar import obviously
does not include all common law rules. 82 If all common law rules applilimit and define their rights. Most of them invest and become parties to
the charter contract without reading the articles to ascertain provisions which

may deprive shareholders of their customary rights and protection. Special
and unusual provisions may thus prove traps for unwary investors and give opportunity for abuse and oppression by the management."

RATIoNs

§ 16 (rev. ed. 1946).
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77. State ex rel. Cochran v. Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 Atl. 257 (Del. Ct.
in Banc 1926); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 89 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd, 93 A.2d 107 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
78. Page v. Anderson, 31 Ind. App. 34, 67 N.E. 205 (1903); Greene v. E. H.
Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d, 249 (Ch. 1938). Illustrative of the
broad, vague attacks that are sometimes made of charter clauses are the
following contentions advanced by plaintiff in Lewis v. H. P. Hood & Sons,
331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850, 852 (1954): "[These] provisions which purport
to give the directors power to call shares of the * * * corporation's common
stock against the will of the holder at any time and for any or no reason
exceed the limits of corporate power established by the governing statutes.
They destroy the independence of stockholders in matters which the statutes
commit to them; they place the stockholders as to all, corporate matters at
the mercy of directors; they violate the basic doctrine that all holders of the
same class of shares be treated alike; indeed they are inherently discriminatory
and by their nature invite abuse. They do, in fact, cut through all the basic
attributes of common stock ownership." The court upheld the provisions.
79. See Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
80. In re Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N.Y. Supp.
430 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 231 N.Y. 615, 132 N.E. 910 (1921).
81. 68 N.J. Eq. 450, 59 Atl. 577 (Ch. 1904).
82. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1952), affirming, 89 A.2d 862 (Del. Ch. 1952).
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cable to corporations were to be held absolutely impregnable to charter modification, there would be little if any room left for the operation of the broad grant of authority to use optional clauses. In general,
the courts have recognized this and have sanctioned some charter
departures from common law rules.
The courts have had a great deal of difficulty deciding what common
law rules can be departed from in the charter and the extent of departure which will be permitted. Thus, in State ex rel. Cochran v.
Penn-Beaver Oil Co.,83 although the court held that statutory authority to use provisions in the charter "to create, define, limit and regulate"
powers of the shareholders did not sanction charter provisions absolutely depriving shareholders of their common law right to inspect
corporate books and records, 84 it indicated that this holding did not
mean that the charter could not limit the common law right and
require it to be exercised at proper times, under proper conditions,
for proper purposes, and so as not unreasonably to interfere with the
company's business. 85 The court drew a distinction between the destruction of a common law right and its regulation, 86 and indicated
that the statute did give authority to limit and regulate by reasonable
charter provision the common law rights and privileges of the shareholder.
The courts appear to look into how firmly fixed a common law rule
is, how strong the policy considerations are which gave rise to it,
and the business need supposedly justifying a departure from it.
The verbal formula worked out by the Delaware courts is that a
charter clause cannot achieve a result "forbidden by settled rules of
public policy" or "transgress a statutory enactment or a public policy
settled by the common law or implicit in the General Corporation Law
itself." 87 Thus, in that state, if there is a split of authority at common
law on a rule regulating the internal affairs of a corporation, the incorporators may adopt the rule sanctioned by the minority common

83. 143 Atl. 257 (Del. 1926).

84. "A common law right can be taken away only by a statute that expressly by necessary implication authorizes it." State ex rel. Cochran v.
Penn-Beaver Oil Co., 143 Atl. 257, 259 (Del. Ct. in Banc 1926). Can a shareholder by simple contract give up his privilege of inspection? See Greene
v. E. H. Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249, 252 (Ch. 1938) ("No individual may exercise his broad power to enter into contract relations so as
to offend against what the law deems to be sound public policy.").
85. Similarly, the courts have held that although reasonable restrictions
on the shareholders' privilege of inspection may be imposed in the by-laws,
by-laws purporting to give the directors absolute power to refuse inspection
are invalid. Klotz v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N.E. 764
(1915); Commonwealth ex rel. Wilde v. Pennsylvania Silk Co., 267 Pa. 331,
110 Atl. 157 (1920).
86. See discussion of the Penn-Beaver case in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 117-18 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
87. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., supra note 86, at 118.
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law view. 88 In Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corporation89 the court
held the rule (accepted as common law by Delaware but not by all
jurisdictions) which precludes the counting of interested directors
for quorum purposes does not invalidate a charter provision which
sanctions their being counted, at least in situations where the action
taken at the directors' meeting is submitted to and approved by the
shareholders.9 0 Similarly, a Delaware court has sustained a charter
provision authorizing sale of all corporate assets on the consent of
holders of three-fourths of the stock, against the objection that the provision was not authorized by statute and was contrary to the common
law.91
A Virginia court has sustained a charter clause authorizing a corporation to enter into partnership arrangements, commenting that
there is not "any essential illegality" in a corporation's forming a partnership and that the charter provision did not authorize "anything
which is malum in se."92 Even when upholding charter provisions

modifying common law rules, courts have cautioned that they will
not sanction the abusive or inequitable use of such charter provisions.9 3
Though courts sometimes profess not to be concerned with the
business wisdom of a challenged charter provision,94 the remarks
judges make in their opinions indicate that in truth courts are greatly
influenced by the judges' views on whether the charter provision is
88. Piccard v. Sperry, 48 F. Supp. 465, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), af'd mern.,
152 F.2d 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 845 (1946).
89. 93 A.2d 107, 118 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
90. Accord, Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 1952) (ap-

proval of stock option plan by interested directors with later stockholder
ratification). See also Martin Foundation v. North American Rayon Corp., 68
A.2d 313 (Del. Ch. 1949) (sustaining a charter clause which the court interpreted as defining the disqualifying interest of directors more broadly
than under Delaware common law).
91. Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 10 Del. Ch. .371, 93 Atl. 380 (Ch.
1915).
92. News-Register Co. v. Rockingham Pub. Co., 118 Va. 140, 86 S.E. 874,
876-77 (1915).
93. "But it must be kept in mind that even a valid provision cannot be
exercised oppressively or for the purpose of discriminating against a single
stockholder or group of stockholders. . . .Hence the exercise of the power
where involved for purposes of reprisal, spite, or other motives tending to
show bad faith would be an abuse of the power and would not stand." Lewis
v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 331 Mass. 670, 121 N.E.2d 850, 853 (1954). A provision
that in the absence of actual fraud, contracts or acts of a majority of the directors shall not be invalid or voidable because some or all of the directors
are interested, and that no director shall be incapacitated from voting because
of his interest is without force as contrary to public policy if construed as
validating a transfer of all the common stock to promoters for an option worth
much less than the par value of the stock. Whalen v. Hudson Hotel Co., 183
App. Div. 316, 170 N.Y. Supp. 855 (3d Dep't 1918). Note that in Piccard v.
Sperry Corp., 48 F. Supp. 465 (D.C.N.Y. 1943), which upheld a charter provision permitting an interested director to be counted towards a quorum,
there was a finding that the action taken by the directors was attended by
good faith, sound business judgment and prudent solicitude for the welfare of
the corporation.
94. Martin Foundation v. North American Rayon Corp., 68 A.2d 313, 316
(Del. Ch. 1949).
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designed to meet a legitimate business need and will contribute to the
efficient operation of the business. 95 Sometimes the courts in talking
about public policy really seemed to be concerned about business
policy. Some courts, for instance, have been reluctant to uphold
charter provisions setting up high vote requirements for shareholder
and director action, because they believe provisions of this type are
likely to cause corporate paralysis.9 The lawyer, in planning and
drafting charter provisions, should keep in mind this tendency of the
courts to be swayed by their estimation of the wisdom and efficacy of
the provisions under consideration.
C. Jurisdictions Without Statutes Authorizing Optional Charter
Clauses.
In a number of states, there appears to be no statutory authorization
for the use of optional charter provisions. 97 The corporation act in
those states simply enumerates the items that must be included in
the charter. Nowhere in the act are optional charter provisions mentioned or statements made indicating the legislature contemplated
use of such provisions.
In spite of this absence of statutory authorization, some lawyers in
those jurisdictions do on occasion insert optional clauses in charters
they prepare. Whether those clauses will be given effect if challenged
is doubtful. Charter clauses not supported by authorization in the
corporation act have met with a varied judicial reception. Many decisions, particularly the earlier ones, held that matters in the charter
not responsive to some specification in the corporation law were void
and would be given no force or effect. 98 Other decisions gave effect
95. "This is in effect to say that such a provision may well fill a legitimate
need in the efficient functioning of the corporate enterprise. We agree; and
we see no basis for declaring it unlawful." Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
93 A.2d 107, 119 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952). In Greene v. E. H. Rollins & Sons,
22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (Ch. 1938), holding invalid a charter provision
which required a shareholder to sell his stock to the corporation on request
by the directors, the court relied in part on the fact that it did not appear
that the restraint was reasonably necessary to advance the corporation's welfare and promote business success.
96. Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co., 24 Del. Ch. 126, 7 A.2d 753 (Ch.
1939), affd, 24 Del. Ch. 349, 14 A.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Kaplan v. Block, 183
Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944). "Right after right is violated. No suit can be

brought without a dissenter's consent, nor can two-thirds of outstanding stock-

holders elect to go out of business. Instances might be multiplied." Kaplan
v. Block, supra,31 S.E.2d at 897.
97. See Auiz. CODE ANN. § 53-301 (1939); IowA CODE § 491.5 (1954); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. c. 53, § 10 (1954); Miss. CODE ANx. § 5310 (Supp. 1952); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 18, § 15 (1951); S.C. CODE §§ 12-58 (1952); Wyo. CoMP. STAT. ANN. §
44-101 (1945). The old Texas Corporation Act, recently replaced by new legislation based on the Model Corporation Act, made no reference to optional provisions. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 3.02 (1955).
98. Oregon Ry. & Nay. Co. v. Oregonian Ry., 130 U.S. 1 (1888); Grangers'
Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Kamper, 73 Ala. 325 (1882); Ross v. Anderson. 31
Ind. ADD. 34, 67 N.E. 207 (1903); Eastern Plankroad Co. v. Vaughan, 14 N.Y.
546 (1856). The reason sometimes given for these holdings is that the specific
enumeration by the statute of the contents of the charter necessarily implies
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to unauthorized charter clauses as by-laws 99 or as agreements binding on persons becoming shareholders with notice of them,100 but
refused to consider them part of the charter. On the other hand, a
number of decisions, even some of the earlier ones, have treated such
clauses as part of the charter as long as they are not prohibited by
statute and are not contrary to public policy.101 In some instances,
charter clauses have been given effect even against persons dealing
with the corporation or its stock without regard to whether those
102
persons actually knew the clauses existed.
D. Effect of Changing Conception of Nature of Corporation on Validity
of Optional Charter Clauses.
A gradual but fundamental change in the way judges and lawyers
think about corporations and the relations created between the state
and businessmen by incorporation is being reflected in judicial decisions passing on the validity of optional charter provisions. A court's
conception of the nature of the corporation and of the function that a
corporate charter serves is an important key to whether that court will
sustain a charter clause which has shaky statutory support or which
is challenged as violative of a statutory norm or as contrary to public
policy.
The traditional theory of course was that a corporation is an artificial, fictitious entity and that a corporate charter is a grant from the
sovereign which gives "life" to a new legal unit. This view is known as
the "concession theory." The grant or concession from the sovereign
had to be accepted in toto by the participants or not at all.
The traditional theory is in part accounted for by the early history
of corporate development in this country. Incorporation in those early
years was by special legislative act; and charters were granted sparingly and usually contained many limitations and safeguards. Legislators and courts feared that a free and unrestricted use of the
corporate device would lead to encroachments upon the liberties and
the exclusion of other items. California Tel. & Light Co. v. Jordan, 19 Cal.
App. 536, 126 Pac. 598 (1912). The unauthorized provisions have generally
been treated as surplusage and have not had the effect of invalidating the
whole charter. McIlvaine v. Foreman, 292 Ill. 224, 126 N.E. 749 (1920); Eastern
Plankroad Co. v. Vaughan, 14 N.Y. 546 (1856); Anderson-Dulin-Varnell Co.
v. Williams, 148 Tenn. 388, 255 S.W. 597 (1923). See also 1 FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CoRpoPATIONS § 150 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1931).

99. Shaw v. Bankers' Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 61 Ind. App. 346, 112 N.E. 16 (1916);

Sherman Center Town Co. v. Morris, 43 Kan. 282, 23 Pac. 569 (1890).

100. See Wright v. Iredell Tel. Co., 182 N.C. 308, 108 S.E. 744, 746 (1921).
101. Estes v. Bank, 172 Miss. 499, 159 So. 104 (1935); Gibbs v. Long Island
Bank, 83 Hun 92, 31 N.Y. Supp. 406 (Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1894). For decisions in
which courts seemed to assume that charter clauses were valid although the
clauses had no statutory support, see Mack v. De Bardelaben C. & I. Co.. 90
Ala. 396, 8 So. 150 (1890); Conant v. Millaudon, 5 La. Ann. 542, 544 (1850).
102. Dempster Mfg. Co. v. Downs, 126 Iowa 80, 101 N.W. 735 (1904).
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opportunities of the individual. 0 3 A legislatively granted charter
usually fixed the corporation's financial and managerial structure; no important arrangements were left to the determination of the
participants. Courts looked upon departures from the approved corporate pattern as violative of legislative intent. Perhaps the reluctance
of the courts to permit deviation from the normal corporate pattern
was reinforced by a desire to maintain uniformity of corporate functions and privileges, and a fear of reckless business arrangements that
might lead to bankruptcies, corporate paralysis, or other results harmful to creditors, minority shareholders or the public.
Since the advent of incorporation under general corporation laws,
and the disappearance of incorporation by special legislative act, the
traditional theory that a corporation is an artificial being created by
sovereign grant has been slowly giving way to the conception of a
corporation as a group of individuals voluntarily associating together
to conduct a business enterprise. 10 4 Modern incorporation statutes give
the incorporators broad freedom to fix the financial and managerial
structure of the corporation and to lay down rules to govern corporate
affairs.
A corporate charter is now often thought of as an agreement among
the participants-a contract regulating the enterprise, its management, and the various rights and duties of the participants. This contract, it is true, must be drawn within the framework of the corporation act; but the sovereign is not thought of as really playing an active
and major role in shaping the agreement.
The modern conception of the corporate charter as primarily a contract among participants in an enterprise is conducive in at least three
respects to an increased judicial readiness to sustain optional charter
provisions. First, courts are somewhat more likely to give a broad
inclusive scope to general statutory provisions authorizing the use of
optional charter clauses. Second, courts are less likely to look upon
rules set forth in the corporation statute as inflexible norms or state105
ments of policy that cannot be deviated from by charter provision.
103. See Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in part, in Louis K. Ligget Co. v.

Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 541 (1933).
104. See Dodd, Amendment of Corporate Articles Under the New Ohio General Corporation Act. 4 U. CiN. L. REV. 129, 130 (1930).
105. As early as 1912, the New York Court of Appeals recognized that at
least some statutory norms (which were not expressly stated as subject to
change by charter provision) could be modified by the insertion of provisions
in the certificate of incorporation. The Court commented that "lawmakers,
while prescribing general rules in default of agreement to the contrary, permitted the incorporators, by agreement made at the inception of the corporation and embodied in the certificate by which the corporation got life, to
regulate these unessential matters in such manner as they might agree." Ripin
v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442. 98 N.E. 855. 856 (1912).
But see Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d 829 (1945) (holding invalid by-laws requiring unanimity for shareholder or director action,
but on grounds broad enough to invalidate such provisions in the charter).
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Courts that consider a charter as a private agreement among businessmen can quite naturally conclude that norms in the corporation act
reflect public policy only to the extent that adherence to them is
necessary to protect the interests of persons not parties to the agreement. Third, courts in jurisdictions which do not have statutes authorizing optional charter provisions are more likely to permit the incorporators to use such provisions on the ground that parties to the
charter contract (like parties to other agreements) should be privileged to use whatever clauses they see fit as long as the clauses are
not prohibited by law or contrary to public policy.
E. Administrative Control of Optional Clauses.
Before filing a charter containing unusual clauses the lawyer should
check to determine whether administrative controls limit the type
of provision that may be included in the charter. In most states, the
charter must be filed with and approved by a Commissioner of Corporations, the Secretary of State or some public official. The official is
usually given power to examine the charter, pass on whether its
provisions are consistent with law and public policy, and reject charters that do not comply. 10 6 The Iowa statute, for example, gives the
Secretary of State substantial power to reject charter provisions which
are not in proper form, which express an unlawful object or are
against public policy, or which show that the corporate plan for doing
business is dishonest or unlawful. 10 7 The Secretary of State appears to
have assumed that this statute empowers him to pass on the propriety
of optional clauses, and the Iowa courts have not seemed inclined to
10 8
interfere with his judgment.
In some jurisdictions, examination and approval of charters by the
Secretary of State is perfunctory. In an increasing number of states,
however, the charter is given a really thorough examination before
it is accepted, and the examining official is inclined to veto extreme
experiments.
The authorities are uniform that although the Secretary of State or
other public official can be compelled by a mandamus to file a charter
containing a provision authorized by law, 10 9 he cannot be required to
file a charter containing a provision that is illegal or unauthorized. 110
106. See Westlake Park Inv. Co. v. Jordan, 198 Cal. 608, 246 Pac. 807 (1926).
107. IOWA CODE § 491.6 (1954).
108. See Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co. 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932).
109. People ex rel. Browne v. Keonig, 133 App. Div. 756, 118 N.Y. Supp. 136

(1st Dep't 1909).

110. People ex rel. Hardin v. Emmerson, 315 Ill. 241, 146 N.E. 129 (1925);
People ex rel. Barney v. Whalen, 119 App. Div. 749, 104 N.Y. Supp. 555 (3d

Dep't). aff'd mem., 189 N.Y. 560, 82 N.E. 1131 (1907) (provision termed "plainly
illegal"); Sneed v. Tippett, 114 Okla. 173, 245 Pac. 40 (1926). "On the
other hand when the provision is reasonably susceptible with an interpretation which will conform to law it is the duty of the Secretary of State to approve the provision." Aspey, Suggestions and Precautionsin Drafting Articles
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To avoid loss of time and the embarrassment that might result from
the rejection of a charter, the lawyer should examine the agency's
regulations, if there are any,"' and he should consider informal submission of questionable provisions in advance of formal submission
for filing. Consultation and the careful spelling out of unorthodox
provisions might avoid a veto that would otherwise be forthcoming.
A change of a few words will sometimes eliminate an objection.
The agency's approval of a doubtful provision may strengthen the
chances of its being upheld when challenged in court. In other words,
the odds that a particular provision will be upheld in litigation are
somewhat greater after agency approval than they are in a mandamus
proceeding to require the agency to accept the charter for filing. In an
Iowa case,11 2 in which the validity of a charter provision restricting
the transferability of shares was in issue, one of the reasons most
strongly relied on by the court in sustaining the provision was that
the charter had been approved by the Secretary of State, who could
have rejected it as containing material contrary to law or public
policy." 3 Further, questions of form, such as whether a particular
provision should be inserted among the financial clauses or in a
separate part of the charter containing optional provisions, appear to
be entirely within the discretion of the public agency with which the
charter is filed." 4 If the public official does file the charter and a court
later holds a clause to be improper, the fact that it contains unauthorized provisions will not render the creation of the corporation
void, such unauthorized provisions at most being treated only as surn5
plusage.
OPTIONAL CLAUSES IN CURRENT USE; BUSINESS NEEDS

CALLING FOR OPTIONAL CLAUSES
A wide variety of optional clauses have been used in the charters
of American corporations. Some optional clauses are used so frequently that they are considered almost "boiler plate." Others are
used in only a few localities or by only a few lawyers or firms.

of Incorporation,in

ORGANIZING AND REVISING SMALL BUSINESS ENTERPRISES

162, 171 (Cal. Pract. Hand Book No. 2, 1954).
111. In some states, the agency has rather detailed regulations. The Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation in Massachusetts has in recent years
generally refused to approve restraints on the transferability of stock other
than those in a form that he himself prepared.
112. Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932).
113. See criticism of this argument in 18 IowA L. REV. 88 (1932).
114. News-Register Co. v. Rockingham Pub. Co., 118 Va. 140, 86 S.E. 874,
878 (1915) (".. . the matter was one which, certainly as to form if not as
to substance, addressed itself to and was clearly within the jurisdiction of the
Corporation Commission, and its action thereon is final"). DODD AND BAKER,
CORPORATIONS 104 n.2 (2d ed. 1951), raise the query of "whether it is the
duty of the public official to accept papers which comply substantially but
not literally with the provisions of the statute."
115. See 1 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §150 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1931).
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The more popular clauses and the recurring business situations
that call for optional provisions are discussed in the following pages
under the subheadings "Management Clauses," "Clauses for Closely
Held Corporations," and "Clauses That Might Strengthen Democratic
Processes in Corporate Government." The clauses considered under
those subheadings, however, do not really give a complete picture
of the wide variation in optional clauses. That can only be shown by
listing some of the less popular and more unusual clauses. Among
the more unusual clauses are provisions which accomplish the following: authorize a charter amendment creating an issue of prior preferred
stock with rights superior to existing preferred and effecting a cancellation of unpaid accumulated dividends;116 limit the right of a director
(absolute and unqualified at common law) to examine corporate books
and records; limit the operations of the corporation to a named business
or kind of activity and provide specifically that no other business can
be undertaken without the unanimous consent of the shareholders;
grant power to the corporation to levy assessments upon the shares
or upon any class of shares;11 7 decrease the vote otherwise required
by statute for extraordinary corporation action such as consolidation,
merger, sale of all corporate assets, dissolution or charter amendment;
authorize employee stock purchase plans and perhaps set forth provisions for payment by installments and for repurchase of the shares
by the corporation upon termination of employment; 18 require that
meetings of shareholders and directors be held in the state of incorporation or authorize those meetings to be held outside the state;" 9
prohibit the declaration of dividends as long as premiums on designated business insurance remain unpaid; permit shareholders to
authorize a corporate recapitalization plan to become operative within
the discretion of the directors; 120 declare insolvent persons ineligible
for election as directors; 121 grant a right to shareholders to change the
corporate domicile; 122 deny to shareholders a statutory right they
would otherwise have to petition for dissolution. 1'
116. See Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 403 Ill. 260, 85 N.E.2d 722, 727
(1949).
117. See CAL. CORP. CODE AxN. § 305 (a) (Deering 1953).
118. See CAL. CORP. CODE AmN. §§ 1107, 1108 (Deering 1953). If the corporation is to be given the right to repurchase, on termination of employment,
perhaps a separate class of shares should be created for issuance to employees.
Otherwise the objection might be made that restrictions imposed on shares
issued to employees are greater than on those issued to other holders.
119. Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 211 App. Div. 132, 207 N.Y. Supp.
574 (3d Dep't 1925). (Under N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 5, if directors' meetings
outside the state are not to be allowed, that limitation must be provided
either in the certificate of incorporation or in the by-laws).
120. See In re McKinney, 306 N.Y. 207, 117 N.E.2d 256, 258 (1954).
121. See Conant v. Millaudon, 5 La. Ann. 542 (1850).
122. See Estes v. Bank, 172 Miss. 499, 159 So. 104 (1935).
123. See Leventhal v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 316 Mass. 194, 55 NoE.2d 20,
154 A.L.R. 260 (1944) (holding the statutory right of a stockholder under
specified conditions to petition for dissolution may be waived by contract).
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In the following paragraphs, which consider the more commonly
used optional clauses, several references are made to judicial decisions
passing on the validity of particular clauses and to statutes which seem
to support certain clauses. A word of caution is necessary. A particular
statutory provision may take on a different meaning in the setting
of another statutory scheme. A judicial decision in one jurisdiction
sustaining a charter clause may be entitled to little or no weight by a
court in another jurisdiction with different statutes. The authorities
mentioned in the following pages therefore must be considered against
the background furnished by the materials in the first part of this
paper on the "Statutory and Case Law Bases for Optional Provisions."124
A. Management Provisions.
Perhaps best known of the optional provisions are a group of clauses
designed to increase the powers and freedom of action of directors
and officers and to protect them against loss from acts taken in their
official capacities. 125 These clauses are often referred to as "management provisions."
The charter of almost every large corporation contains a clause
which provides 126 (1) that corporate transactions shall not be invalidated or affected by the fact that some of its officers, directors or
shareholders are interested in another corporation that is a party to
the transaction, (2) that interested directors shall be counted in determining whether a quorum exists at directors' meetings and may
vote with the same effect as disinterested directors, 1 7 and (3) that
interested directors are relieved from liability that might otherwise
arise by reason of their contracting with the corporation for the
benefit of themselves or any firm or corporation in which they are
interested. The prevalence in the modern business world of transactions between corporations and their directors and of transactions
124. See pp. 1-23 supra.
125. For a set of specimen charter provisions "for the regulation of the
internal affairs of the corporation," see PANTZER AND O'NEAL, THE DRAFTING OF
CORPORATE CHARTERS AND BY-LAws 81-84 (1951).

126. A less common provision but one directed toward the same problem
states: "No contract or other transaction between the Corporation, and one
or more of its directors, officers or stockholders, or between the Corporation
and any other corporation, firm or association, in which one or more of its
directors, officers or stockholders are officers, directors or stockholders, shall
be either void or voidable (1) if at a meeting of the Board of Directors or
committee authorizing or ratifying the contract or transaction there is a
quorum of persons not so interested in the contract or other transaction, and
such contract or other transaction is approved by a majority of such quorum,
or (2) if the contract or other transaction is ratified at an annual or special
meeting of stockholders, or (3) if the contract or other transaction is just
and reasonable to the Corporation at the time it is made, authorized or
ratified."
127. Full disclosure of interest is often expressly made a condition of the
application of parts (1) and (2) of the clause.
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between corporations with interlocking directorates have made optional charter provisions of this sort necessary.
Just exactly what legal effect a clause of this kind has is doubtful.
It will not relieve an officer or director from liability for actual fraud. 128
It might, however, change the standard of fairness or burden of proof
that would otherwise prevail whenever a transaction between a corporation and interested directors or between corporations with interlocking directors is challenged. 12 9 Further, the statement that interested directors are to be counted in determining a quorum has been
uniformly given effect, at least if the transaction later was approved
130
by the shareholders.
Another common management clause is designed to indemnify
corporate representatives for losses incurred while acting in corporate capacities. A clause of this type typically provides that the
corporation will indemnify its directors, officers and other representatives for the reasonable expenses including attorneys' fees incurred
in the defense of litigation to which they are made parties by reason
31
of their relation to the corporation.'
128. See Whalen v. Hudson Hotel Co., 183 App. Div. 316, 170 N.Y. Supp. 855
(3d Dep't 1918).
129. See DODD AND BAKER, CORPORATIONS 478 n.2 (2d ed. 1951). "[The]
provision of the certificate of incorporation of Empire Power Corporation
expressly authorizing the directors to act even in matters where they
had dual interest, has the effect of exonerating the directors, at least
in part, 'from adverse inferences which might otherwise be drawn against
them."' Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43 N.E.2d 18, 22 (1942). "The
finding as to 'bad faith' appears to rest largely upon the circumstance that
the individual defendants were directors of the bank as well as of the
defendant, and that one was also a director of the Beacon Trust Building
Trust, Inc. But such interlocking directorates were expressly permitted by
the corporate organization of the defendant. Of course, this gave no immunity
to the defendant and directors to be guilty of bad faith. But it exonerates them
from adverse inference which might otherwise be drawn against them."
Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, 297 Mass. 398, 417, 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (1937).
"This provision is useful only to overcome any presumption of fraud or invalidity which might attach." ISRAELS AND GORMAN, CORPORATE PRACTICE 107
(1954). See also Ewen v. Peoria & E. Ry., 78 F. Supp. 312, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
52 MicH. L. REV. 295 (1953).
130. Piccard v. Sperry, 48 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd mem., 152 F.2d
462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 845 (1946); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952); Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d 786
(Del. Ch. 1952).
131. A typical clause provides: "The Corporation shall indemnify any
and all of its directors or officers or former directors or former officers or any
person who may have served at its request as a director or officer of another
corporation in which it owns shares of capital stock or of which it is a creditor
against expenses incurred by them in connection with the defense or settlement of any action, suit or proceeding brought or threatened in which they,
or any of them, are or might be made parties, or a party, by reason of being
or having been directors of officers or a director of officer of the Corporation,
or of such other corporation, except in relation to matters as to which any
such director or officer or former director or officer or person shall be
adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding to be liable for negligence or
misconduct in the performance of duty. Such indemnification shall not be
deemed exclusive of any other rights to which those indemnified may be
entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise."
For a comprehensive discussion of indemnity clauses, see WASHINGTON, CORPO-
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Statutes in a number of states expressly authorize the use of indemnification provisions in the charter. The statutes differ considerably, however, on the extent of the indemnification that can be
provided. 132 Most of them permit indemnification only of corporate
representatives who are free from negligence or misconduct. The
New York statute, for instance, expressly excepts from the permissible coverage expenses incurred "in relation to matters as to which
it shall be adjudged . . .that such officer, director or employee is
liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties.' 133
Further, the New York statute has been construed not to permit
reimbursement if a settlement is made without court approval. 134
Some statutes give corporate representatives a right to recover
litigation expenses, without regard to whether the corporation's charter contains an indemnification clause. 3 5 A statute of this kind or
judicial recognition of a common law right of indemnification does
not necessarily eliminate the need for a charter clause. The statutory
or common law right may not be sufficiently inclusive to give desired
protection or it may leave doubtful the coverage of some losses. The
New York statutory right of indemnification, for instance, does not
reimburse expenses incurred in defending against prosecutions under
the Sherman 'Antitrust Act or in other criminal proceedings. 3 6 Perhaps indemnification for expense incurred in criminal proceedings
3 7
cannot be provided in New York even by express charter provision;
in some states, however, the law seems elastic enough to permit indemnification clauses that include expenses of criminal litigation. 3 8
RATE EXECUTIVES' COMPENSATION C. 19 (1942).

Even in the absence of statute

or charter clause, some courts recognize a right in directors or officers to reim-

bursement for expenses incurred in defending themselves against a shareholders' action. See In re E. C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 45 N.W.2d 388 (1950);

Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (Ch. 1941) (the court

in which a shareholders' suit is brought can decree reimbursement). But see
Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N.Y. Supp. 2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd mem.,
267 App. Div. 899, 43 N.Y.2d 324 (1st Dep't 1944), aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 735, 56
N.E.2d 739 (1944) (directors who successfully defend actions brought against
them charging misfeance in office do not have common law right of reimbursement); New York Dock Co. v. McCollom, 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.2d 844
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
132. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 53, § 24 (1954); N.J. REV. STAT. §
14:3-14 (Supp. 1944); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 66-68. For discussions of indemnification statutes, see STEVENS, CORPORATONS § 174 (2d ed. 1949); Comment, 52 McH. L. REV. 1023, 1030-42 (1954).
133. N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw §§ 66-68.
134. Letter from N.Y. Atty. Gen. to N.Y. Sec'y of State, Dec. 31, 1953.
135. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. CORP.LAW § 64.
136. Schwartz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d
533 (1953). Further, New York has held that statutory indemnification will
be denied a director who engaged in wrong-doing even though he was never
formally and literally adjudged liable for misconduct. Diamond v. Diamond,
307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d 819 (1954).
137. The Secretary of State of New York will not accept for filing certificates
of incorporation which include provisions for indemnification of expenses incurred in criminal actions.
138. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 8, § 122(10) (1953) (after specifying that
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Further, a statutory right may not protect corporate representatives
other than directors and officers, or may not protect corporate personnel serving at the corporation's request with subsidiaries. Finally,
if a claim for reimbursement is based upon statute, a question may
arise of whether the statutory right has extra-territorial effect. 13
The statutory right probably would be enforceable only in the courts
of the state granting that right; and even in the courts of that state,
a director or other corporate representative might not be able to
recover litigation expenses incurred in suits brought against him in
other jurisdictions. On the other hand, a charter provision can be
drafted to cover expenses wherever incurred and a claim based thereon
apparently would be enforceable in other jurisdictions as well as the
state of incorporation.
At least one statute, however, makes the statutory remedy the
exclusive method by which indemnification can be obtained and precludes the use of charter provision to vary the scope of indemnification. 140
Even if a state does not have a statute authorizing the use of indemnification provisions in the charter, it still may be wise to include
such a provision in the charter. Undoubtedly the charter clause would
not lessen the chance of recovery.
One word of caution is in order against excessive zeal in providing
indemnification for corporate representatives. Draftsmen should be on
the alert not to free directors and officers from proper liability for
misconduct in office. Provisions to indemnify for amounts paid on
judgments or in compromise settlements should be inserted only after
.careful consideration.' 4'
corporations shall have power to indemnify directors and officers, the statute
states: "Such indenmification shall not be deemed exclusive of any other
rights to which those indemnified may be entitled, under any by-law, agreement, vote of stockholders, or otherwise." The Secretary of State of Delaware
will accept charters containing a limited indemnification clause for expense
in criminal actions, such as the following: "In the case of a criminal action,
suit or proceeding, a conviction or judgment (whether based on a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere or its equivalent, or after trial) shall not be deemed
an adjudication that such director or officer is liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duties, if such director or officer were
acting in good faith in what he considered to be the best interests of the
corporation and with no reasonable cause to believe that the action was
illegal."
139. See STEVENS, CoRPoRATIoNs § 174 (2d ed. 1949).
140. CAL. COP. CODE ANN. . 830(e) (Deering 1953). See also Ballantine,
California's 1943 Statute as to Directors' LitigationExpenses, 31 CALIF. L. REV.
515 (1943).

141. A statement that is sometimes included in the indemnification provisions
is as follows: '"he corporation may also reimburse to any director, officer
or employee the reasonable costs of settlement of any action, suit or proceeding, if it shall be found by a majority of a committee composed of the
directors not involved in the matter in controversy (whether or not a quorum)
that it was to be the interests of the corporation that the settlement be made
and that the director, officer or employee was not guilty of negligence or misconduct."
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_Another popular management provision, protects directors who
rely in good faith on the books and records of the corporation. Typical
wording for a clause of this kind is as follows:
A director shall not be liable for dividends illegally declared, distributions illegally made to shareholders, or any other action taken in reliance
in good faith upon financial statements of the corporation represented to
him to be correct by the president of the corporation or the officer of
the corporation having charge of its books of account, or certified by an
independent public or certified accountant to fairly reflect the financial
condition of the corporation; nor shall he be liable if in good faith in
determining the amount available for dividends or distributions he considers the assets to be of their book value.
A recurrent problem of directors is to find a way to fix their own
compensation. To meet this problem, a charter clause is often used
which expressly authorizes the board of directors to make provision
for compensating its members for their services as directors and
clearly specifies that directors may serve the corporation in other
142
capacities and receive compensation for those additional services.
Sometimes the compensation of the directors is fixed in the charter
143
itself as some specified percentage of net profits.
142. See Adams v. Mid-West Chevrolet Corp., 198 Okla. 461, 179 P.2d 147,
175 A.L.R. 584 (1947) (by-law stating that a director might serve the corporation in some other capacity and receive "compensation therefor in any
amount fixed by the board of directors with full membership present and
acting" held to permit an interested director to vote to increase his salary as
president).
143. The following provision (from the charter of an investment trust incorporated in New York) fixes the directors' compensation at a percentage of
net profits:
"Unless and until otherwise provided by a by-law or by-laws duly adopted
by the holders of a majority of the stock of the corporation at the time outstanding and entitled to vote the directors of the corporation, as such, shall
be paid as compensation for their services as directors and for proportionate
distribution among them, a sum equal to eight per cent (8%) of the net
profits of the corporation each year. At the end of each year the amount of
compensation to which the directors are so entitled shall be determined and
set aside on the books of the corporation as owing to the directors. Payment
of any such amounts so determined at the end of each year and as accumulated
from year to year shall only be made under and subject to the following restrictions: The corporation shall not pay any portion of its net profits as
compensation to the directors as such unless there is concurrently therewith distributed to the stockholders as dividends and amount of net profits
or surplus of the corporation equal to at least twice the aggregate amount
of such compensation to be paid to the directors; provided that upon any
liquidation or dissolution of the corporation, whether voluntary or involuntary,
the directors shall be entitled to receive the balance of any compensation so
owed to them before any payment or other distribution is made to the
stockholders of the corporation.
"The net profits of the corporation for the purposes of this provision for
compensation to the directors shall be determined by a certified public accountant selected by the board of directors.
"The foregoing provision for compensation to the directors shall be additional to a fee of twenty dollars ($20.00) to each director for attendance at
meetings and reimbursements for expenses incurred through attendance at
meetings and otherwise in and about the affairs of the corporation and to
such sums, if any, as may be paid to any director for services rendered
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Many charters contain a clause which authorizes the board of directors to determine whether and to what extent and at what times and
places and under what conditions the books and accounts of the corporation will be open to inspection by the stockholders, and provides
that a stockholder shall not have any right to inspect the books,
accounts or documents of the corporation except as conferred by law
or authorized by resolution of the directors or of the shareholders. 144
In the leading case of State ex rel. Cochranv. Penn-Beaver Oil Co.,145
the court refused to give effect to a provision of this kind. The court
there held that a statute permitting the inclusion in the charter of
provisions "creating, defining, limiting and regulating" powers of
shareholders does not authorize a clause empowering the directors
to abolish entirely the shareholders' privilege of inspection or a clause
making the exercise of the privilege dependent solely on the arbitrary
discretion of the directors.
Exactly what limitations can be placed on shareholders' privileges
to examine corporate books and records is not entirely clear. The
statutes in most jurisdictions do not spell out with any particularity
what inspection privileges the shareholders have,146 and seem to permit modification of those privileges in the charter or by-laws. The
court in the Penn-Beaver case indicated that reasonable restrictions
can be placed on those privileges, that a charter clause can validly
provide that inspection privileges must be exercised "at proper times,
under proper conditions, for a proper purpose and so as not to interfere with the company's business."'147
The task of drafting a charter provision to define specifically the
inspection rights of shareholders is a challenging one. The draftsman
must determine what restrictions may be placed on the time and
place of inspection, on the percentage or number of shares that may
demand an inspection and on the purpose for which an inspection
to the corporation otherwise than in the capacity of director.
"The directors entitled to the payment herein provided for shall be those
who shall have served as directors during the whole or any part of any year
in which were earned any profits which are to serve as a basis for the
determination of such compensation to the directors. In the event that any

director shall have failed to serve as such during the whole of any year he
shall be entitled to receive for each full calendar month of service as director, only one-twelfth of what he would have received had he been a director during the full year.
"The term 'year' as used herein shall be the calendar year."
144. See Koenigsberg, Provisions in Corporate Charters and Bv-Laws Governing the Inspection of Books by Stockholders, 30 GEO. L.J. 227 (1942). In

the absence of statute and charter or by-law provision, shareholders are
privileged to inspect corporate books and records at reasonable times and for
proper purposes.
145. 143 Atl. 257 (Del. 1926).
146. For a discussion of some of the statutes see Koenigsberg. supra note 144,
at 242. At least one statute, however, sets forth the shareholders' inspection
rights in detail and provides that those rights cannot be limited in the
charter or by-laws. CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 3003 (Deering 1953).
147. 143 Atl. 257, 260 (Del. 1926).
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may be made. He will also need to consider the possibility of drafting
separate inspection regulations for different types of books and records.
A clause regulating inspection rights should specify with particularity exactly what contracts, business documents and other records
are subject to inspection. The clause might include a statement that
shareholders shall not have the right to examine or receive information on "patents, inventions, apparatus, equipment, designs, blueprints, formulae, processes or other similar rights or property of the
corporation or in respect to which the corporation may have any
license or right."
The draftsman should also consider ways of preventing information
obtained by an inspecting shareholder from being used to the detriment of the corporation. Perhaps he can set up as a condition of the
inspection privilege an undertaking by the shareholder to indemnify
the corporation for losses suffered from improper disclosure of information obtained in the course of the inspection. Further, it may be
advisable to provide that a shareholder cannot delegate his right of
inspection to a certified public accountant unless the shareholder and
the accountant agree to furnish the corporation promptly a copy of
each report made by the accountant.
Many charters contain a clause denying or limiting the shareholders'
preemptive rights or the preemptive rights of one or more classes of
shares. In most jurisdictions, there is considerable uncertainty in the
absence of a charter provision as to the scope of Shareholders' preemptive rights. Further, in a corporation with a complex stock structure,
elimination of preemptive rights may be desirable to avoid the difficult task of apportioning new share issues among the various classes
of shareholders. Most jurisdictions have statutes which expressly
permit charter denial or restriction of preemptive rights,148 and even
in the absence of statute most courts would probably give effect to
charter provisions accomplishing that result. 149
Even though shareholders are to retain their common law or statutory preemptive rights, a charter provision is desirable to require the
shareholders to exercise their options and pay for the shares within a
specified time after notice. If shareholders in a corporation with
several classes of stock are to have preemptive rights, special care
must be used in spelling out the rights of each class.
There are many other clauses which can be used to increase the
148. See, e.g., MICH. Com. LAWS § 450.31 (Mason Supp. 1952).

149. See Ohio Ins. Co. v. Nunnemacher, 15 Ind. 294 (1860) (pre-emptive rights

completely eliminated); Real Estate Trust Co. v. Bird, 90 Md. 229, 44 Atl. 1048
(1899) (pre-emptive rights can be qualified or regulated by charter). "It
may be pointed out in this connection that the common-law rule granting the
stockholder a pre-emptive right is not a strict rule of law, based upon public
policy, but is a rule of intention resting upon a fair implication from the contract between the stockholder and the corporation." BRUNE, MARYLAND CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 97 (rev. ed. 1953).
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power of the directors or free them from burdensome restrictions
that interfere with the quick and efficient operation of the business 15 0
Among these are provisions to accomplish the following, permit directors' and shareholders' meetings to be held outside the state of incorporation at places from time to time designated in the by-laws or by
resolution of the board of directors; 151 authorize the establishment of
corporate offices and the keeping of corporate books outside the state
of incorporation; give the directors power to adopt and amend by-laws
without the assent of the shareholders; authorize the directors to
determine the amount to be reserved as working capital and the
amount to be set aside as contingency funds; empower the directors
to fix or alter the various rights, powers and preferences of unissued
stock; vest the entire control of the corporation in the directors for
a specified period of time and deprive shareholders of all participation;152 give the directors power to fill vacancies that occur on the
board; set quorum requirements or the vote necessary for shareholder
or director action at a lower percentage of the shareholders or directors than would otherwise be required; give the directors power to
'fix the consideration for shares that are issued; empower the directors
to sell all the corporation's property; and authorize the board of
airectors to make temporary and unsecured loans.
B. Clauses for Closely Held Corporations.
Optional charter provisions are particularly useful in molding the
corporate device to the needs of closely held enterprises. Participants
in a closely held enterprise usually consider themselves partners
as to each other even if the enterprise is incorporated. They almost
invariably want to be in a position to choose future associates and
to bar the admission of persons affiliated with competitors and other
outsiders who would not fit into their organization harmoniously. Thus,
restrictions are commonly placed on the transferability of stock.
Especially popular are clauses giving the corporation or the other
shareholders a "first option" to purchase shares of a holder who decides
to sell and sometimes of a holder who ceases to be an officer, director
or employee of the corporation.
Reasonable stock transfer restrictions, at least the widely used
150. Some of these provisions are phrased in language of sweeping scope.
Note the following specimen: "In addition to the powers and authorities hereinabove or by statute expressly conferred, the Board of Directors of the Corporation is hereby authorized to exercise all such powers and to do all such
acts and things as may be exercised or done by a corporation organized and
existing under the provisions of the Act."
151. See Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph Co., 11 Del. Ch. 190, 98 AtI. 943
(Ch. 1916); 11 Del. Ch. 412, 102 Ati. 988 (Sup. Ct. 1918), sustaining a clause of
this sort.
152. See Union Trust Co. v. Carter, 139 Fed. 717 (C.C.W.D. Va. 1905), a
questionable decision, sustaining a charter clause giving the directors complete control for six years.
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"first option" provisions, are now sustained in almost all jurisdictions.153
Clauses giving the shareholders or some of them power to veto
corporate decisions are also frequently used in closely held enterprises. Participants in a closely held corporation commonly want
powers (similar to those of partners in a firm) to veto corporate
policies and decisions. This veto power can be given them by charter
clauses requiring unanimity or a high vote for shareholder and director
action or by clauses fixing high quorum requirements for meetings of
shareholders and directors. Statutory or judicial support can be found
in many jurisdictions for charter clauses which require unanimity or
a high vote for shareholder or director action or fix high quorum
154
requirements for shareholder and director meetings.
Both stock restrictions and veto provisions pose many difficult
problems in planning and drafting, and the lawyer should give special
study to precautions that will increase the serviceability of these
provisions and protect them against circumvention or attack. 155
In working out arrangements to divide control among the several
shareholders in a closely held corporation, the lawyer may want to
include in the charter a provision for the election of directors by
cumulative voting. By setting up cumulative voting, he may be able
to insure to each shareholder a representative on the board of directors.
Thus, cumulative voting coupled with a high vote requirement for
director action can give each shareholder a veto over action within the
province of the board of. directors. As the classification of directors
may have the effect of depriving a particular shareholder of the ability
he would otherwise have to elect a representative to the board of
directors, it may be wise to include in the articles a prohibition against
the classification of directors.
There are many clauses besides veto provisions and provisions for
cumulative voting that may be useful in setting up a control pattern
153. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 745 (1948); Cary, How Illinois Corporations May
Enjoy PartnershipAdvantages, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 427 (1953); Cataldo, Stock
Transfer Restrictions and the Closed Corporations,37 VA. L. Rsv. 229 (1951);
O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:Planning and Drafting, 65 HARV. L. REV. 773, 777-84 (1952). A charter clause which
was once in quite common use in both public held and closely held corporations
gave the corporation a lien on a-shareholder's stock to secure the payment of
his indebtedness to the corporation. See Dempster MAfg, Co. v. Downs, 126
Iowa 80, 101 N.W. 735 (1904); Gibbs v. Long Island Bank, 83 Hun 92, 31
N.Y. Supp. 506 (Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1894), afj'd, 151 N.Y. 657, 46 N.E. 1147 (1897);
Bohmer & Osterloh v. City Bank, 77 Va. 445 (1883).
154. O'Neal, Giving Shareholders Power to Veto Corporate Decisions: Use
of Special Charter and By-Law Provisions, 18 LAW & CONTEMI. PROB. 451,
457-64 (1953). Perhaps the best known of the statutes expressly authorizing
the use of high vote and high quorum requirements in the charter .is N.Y.
STOCK CORP. LAW § 9.
155. See O'Neal, Restrictions on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held C6rporations: Planning and Drafting, 65 HARv. L. REV. 773 (1952); O'Neal, suprd
note 154.
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for a closely held corporation. Among these are clauses which provide
that the number of directors fixed in the charter shall not be changed
except with the unanimous consent of the shareholders; 5 6 permit the
shareholders or a particular shareholder to remove directors at any
time with or without cause; 157 grant to the shareholders, a particular
class of shareholders, or named individual shareholders the power to
select the officers or specified officers and fix their compensations; 15 8
provide that specified officers cannot be removed by the directors without cause or can be removed only by a unanimous vote of the directors; 159 provide that directors elected by designated shareholders or
by a particular shareholder shall have exclusive power to select the
officers or to select designated officers; 160 require a person to own a
minimum number of shares to be eligible to serve as a director (this
coupled with restrictions on the transferability of shares and on the
issuance of additional shares may be used to "freeze" all shareholders
on the board of directors);161 confer upon the shareholders powers
ordinarily exercised by the directors (for instance, provide that the
shareholders, not the directors, will make the by-laws);162 require
shareholder approval for the sale or mortgage of corporate assets; 163
provide that voting at shareholders' meetings shall be by classes of
shareholders in elections of directors and perhaps on other matters;
provide that directors shall hold office for life or shall not be changed
156. See Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 205 N.Y. 442, 98 N.E.
855 (1912); cf. Christal v. Petry, 275 App. Div. 550, 90 N.Y.S.2d 620 (1st Dep't
1949), aifd mem., 301 N.Y. 562, 93 N.E.2d 450 (1950.).
157. For a discussion of validity of a by-law to this effect, see Proceedings
at the Annual Meeting of the Section of Corporation,Banking and Business
Law (Chicago, August 16-17, 1954), 10 BuSINESs LAW., Nov. 1954, p. 9, 10-12.
See also Petition of Singer, 189 Misc. 150, 70 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1947);
BALLANTINE, COm'ORATIONS § 163 (2d ed. 1949). If directors are elected by
cumulative voting, a clause giving shareholders power to remove part of the
directors is inappropriate.
158. See Del. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (1953), indicating that by a provision
in the by-laws the shareholders can be given power to elect officers.
159. See Petition of Buckley, 50 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct. 1944), sustaining bylaw that prohibited directors from removing chairman of the board without
cause.
160. See LA. REV. STAT. § 12:34 (1950).
161. "Especially where the number of individual stockholders is few, as in
the typical Iowa corporation, representation on the board is very important.
Devices can be built into the articles that may insure that representation.
One method is to provide that all shareholders are to be directors. * * * Another method is to require that directors be shareholders, in which case
the permissible number of directors often is equal to the number of shareholders outstanding." Hayes, Stockholders' Rights in the Iowa Corporation (Part
IV of a Study of Iowa Incorporation Practices), 40 IowA L. REv. 459, 469
(1955).
162. Many corporation statutes provide in some manner for the making of
by-laws by the directors as well as the shareholders. Some statutes provide
that the power to make by-laws shall be in the directors unless it is reserved
to the shareholders by the charter.
163. See Mannhardt v. Illinois Staats Zeintung Co., 90 Ill. App. 315 (1900);
Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Aleman Planting & Mfg. Co.. 166 La.
457, 117 So. 554 (1928) ; Bishop v. Kent & Stanley, 20 R.I. 680, 41 AtI. 255 (1898).
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except by unanimous vote of the shareholders (courts in most jurisdictions probably would not sustain a clause to this effect);14 limit the
number or percentage of votes a shareholder may cast irrespective of
the number of shares held; restrict the number of shares a person may
hold or decrease the voting power of shares acquired by a holder in
excess of a specified number; 165 classify the board of directors and
provide for election of part by one group of shareholders and part by
another group.166
In many closely held enterprises, there is really no need for a board
of directors.

167

Shareholders should be permitted to run the corpora-

164. See Note, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 368 (1928). "It is easy to see objections to such a provision as that directors shall be displaced only by .the
unanimous consent of the stockholders where there are thirty thousand of
the latter, but does the objection hold where there are three?" Weiner, Legislative Recognition of the Close Corporation, 27 MIcH. L. REV. 273, 277 (1929).
165. See KAx. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2803(E) (1949). See also Mack v.
Debardeleben Coal Co., 90 Ala. 396, 20 So. 150 (1889) (charter clause sustained
that provided that no shareholder should vote more than one-fourth of the
stock); Bartlett v. Fourton, 115 La. 26, 38 So. 882 (1905) (charter clause that
no individual should hold more than a specified number of shares upheld).
If a statute states that each.shareholder "shall have" one vote for each share,
the courts usually hold invalid charter clauses or by-laws that attempt to restrict the accumulation of voting power. See People v. Emmerson, 302 Ill.
300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922); State v. Day, 189 Ind. 243, 123 N.E. 402 (1919). But
see British Murac Syndicate v. Alperton Co., 113 L.T.R. 373 (1915). N.Y.
GEN. CoRp. LAW § 23 provides: "Unless otherwise provided in the certificate of
incorporation each stockholder shall have one vote per share."
166. See Investment Associates v. Standard Power & Light Corp., 29 Del.
Ch. 225, 48 A.2d 501 (Ch. 1946), aff'd, 51 A.2d 572 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1947). "The
articles may provide that a particular class or classes of shares or securities
. . . may elect all or a certain number or proportion of the directors." LA.
REV. STAT. § 12:34 (1950). The articles of association of the hospital (a corporation without capital stock) before the court in Lehmaier v. Bedford, 99
Conn. 468, 121 Atl. 810 (1923), divided the directors into two classes,, those
elected for a stated term by the members and those who became life directors
by payment of a specified sum of money, and provided inter alia that quorum
should consist of "seven of the elected directors" and that the by-laws could
not be changed unless the alteration was proposed in writing by at least twelve
directors, of whom six had to be elected directors. For a discussion of whether
staggered terms for directors violate constitutional or statutory mandates
making cumulative voting mandatory, see Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126
N.E.2d 701 (1955); Humphreys v. Winous Co., 125 N.E.2d 204 (Ohio App.
1955); Comment, 7 MVERcR L. REV. 227 (1955).
167. "The Board, however, is generally but a superfluous complication. On
the one hand, five stockholders may well manage their own affairs. On the
other, once they create a board, the stockholders are shackled.
'Tor example, the board may be well-constituted to prevent the majority
stockholder from dominating it. But where it is intended that he be sole
determiner of dividend policies, but not of other action, the board generally
cannot be adapted to both purposes." Winer, Proposing a New York "Close
CorporationLaw," 28 CoRNELL L.Q. 313, 316-17 (1943). Note also the following
remarks of William H. Neiman in Proceedings at the Annual Meeting of the
Section of Corporation,Banking and Business Law (Chicago, August 16-17,
1954), 10 Busnqss LAw. Nov. 1954, p. 9, 36; "The theory that the corporation
conducts its normal operations only through directors is based upon the unfounded assumption that there is a traditional division of corporate functions.
However, some of today's so-called "norms" are the precise reverse of earlier
practices. Shareholders in the eighteenth century voted directly on certain
matters of corporate policy and appointed the executive officers. In England
the shareholders are regarded as the source of the directors' power. As I
have already mentioned, Iowa does not require a board of directors. I
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tion through officers selected directly by them. However, the corporation statutes in most states (Iowa is an exception) seem to require
a board; and even aside from statutory requirements, the idea that
a board of directors is an essential item in a corporation is so firmly
engrained in the thinking of the courts and of the officials with whom
the charter must be filed, that an attempt to dispense with the board
might run into serious difficulties. Charter provisions giving the
shareholders or even designated officers many of the powers normally
within the province of the directors perhaps offer more hope.16 8 The
draftsman might well consider the possibility of giving management
powers (the power to elect officers and to declare dividends, for
instance) to the shareholders. Even here, however, the draftsman runs
into the principle-often enunciated by the courts-that the share169
holders cannot create a "sterilized" board of directors.
Some of the possibilities for setting up a management structure for
a closely held corporation through the combination of several optional
clauses are suggested by a group of clauses commonly used by a Massachusetts law firm. One clause sets up two classes of stock with
identical rights except that each class acts separately to elect designated directors. Other clauses require the Treasurer, and perhaps the
Assistant Treasurer, to be a holder of a particular class of stock, say
Class A, and the President, and perhaps the Vice President, to be a
director elected by a particular class of stock, say Class B. 170 The reason for the difference in treatment between the Treasurer and the
President is that Massachusetts law requires that the President must
be elected by and from the Board of Directors, whereas the Treasurer is elected by the shareholders.171
In preparing a charter for a closely held corporation, a need may
arise for a type of clause not customarily placed in charters. For
instance, in setting up a procedure for surviving shareholders to purchase the shares of a deceased holder, the draftsman may want to
include clauses to bind the corporation or the shareholders to purchase
think it is pointless to insist upon prerogatives when they have no utility.
Often a board of directors has no real function in a closely held corporation."
168. In North-West Trans. Co. v. Beatty, 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C. 1887), the
Privy Council quoted a by-law which provided: ". . . the powers conferred
upon the directors by Section 22 were made subject to a proviso that one-fourth
part in value of the shareholders of the company should at all times have the
right to call a special meeting for the transaction of any business specified in
such written requisition and notice as they might issue to that affect." See also
Group Property, Inc. v. Bruce, 248 P.2d 761 (Cal. App. 1952) (charter may
designate individual manager of corporation with power to supervise and
direct its business).
169. See Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (1918). For a
discussion of shareholder contracts that limit the discretion of directors, see
STmnNs, CoRPORATIoNs § 146 (2d ed. 1949).
170. Speciman clause: "The Treasurer and any Assistant Treasurer must be
a holder of Class A stock. The President and any Vice President shall be
elected by and from the Board of Directors, but must be Directors of Class B."
171. MAss. AN. LAWS c. 156, § 22 (1948).
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business insurance that will provide readily available funds when the
shareholder dies. A matter of this kind is customarily covered by a
shareholders' agreement, but coverage in the charter may offer advantages. 17 2 Similarly, the draftsman may find it convenient to "personalize" some of the clauses and refer to particular shareholders by
name. Little can be said on the validity of unorthodox provisions of
these types. Perhaps they would be sustained under the broadly
worded statutes authorizing optional provisions. 1 3 In Larsen v. The
Lilly Estate,17 4 the court without citing any statutory authority upheld
a charter provision reading as follows:
Should Charles H. Lilly, Jr. and/or

-Gordon Lilly,

at the time they

respectively arrive at the age of twenty-one years, own any of the
preferred stock, the preferred stock which the one arriving at the age
of twenty-one years may own at that time, may be surrendered to the
company, and he shall be entitled to receive from the company in exchange
therefore, a like number of shares of common stock, and for that purpose the surrendered preferred stock shall be re-issued as common stock.
The Secretary of State in some states, however, "is reluctant' to file
charters containing clauses couched in anything other than the traditional, impersonal and rather stereotyped charter language.
Sometimes lawyers want to authorize shareholders and directors
to act informally and without meetings. According to traditional
doctrine, neither shareholders nor directors can act except at duly
called meetings. 175 As a matter of fact, however, most family corporations and other closely held companies rarely hold the meetings
required by law or follow the conventional formalities of the corporate ritual. Further, as directors and shareholders are usually the
same people, they do not differentiate clearly between what they do in
one capacity and what they do in the other. A failure to comply with
corporate formalities is probably further encouraged by (i)' a desire
to expedite the operation of the business and avoid unnecessary expense and (2) a feeling that as the business is really owned' by the
172. See pp. 46-51 infra.

173. See p. 5 supra. In Orme v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n,
25 Ariz. 324, 217 Pac. 935 (1923), the court upheld a charter clause which set
up a thirty member council and an eleven member board of governors for a
corporation and provided that three members of the council and one board
member were to be elected from each of ten reservoir districts by shareholders
located in the particular district. Each shareholder was entitled to one vote

for each share held but not to a total of more than 160 votes. Further, each
voter must have owned his shares for twenty days before the election and had
to be at least twenty-one years of age and of sound mind. See also Group
Property, Inc. v. Bruce, 248 P.2d 761 (Cal. App. 1952) (charter designated
individual to be manager and supervise and direct corporation's business);
Lehmaier v. Bedford, 99 Conn. 468, 121 Atl. 810 (1923).
174. 34 Wash. 2d 39, 208 P.2d 150 (1949).

175. BALLANTINE, CoRPoRATIoNs §§ 119, 145 (2d ed. 1949). A waiver signed

after the meeting cannot cure the defect. Hill Dredging Co. v. Risley, 18

N.J. 501, 114 A.2d 687 (1955).
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managers there is no real need to follow practices designed to protect nonmanager owners.
In view of this tendency of participants in closely held enterprises
to disregard the corporate ritual, lawyers might well consider ways
of giving legal effect to the informal practices actually followed. One
approach is to provide in the charter that any action that may be taken
at a meeting of shareholders or directors may be taken without a
meeting if authorized by a writing signed by all persons who would
have been entitled to vote at the meeting. 7 6 Another approach is to
authorize directors as well as shareholders to vote by proxy. 77 Even
these approaches do not take care of some common practices, such as
making decisions over the telephone.
The validity of charter provisions providing for informal action is
78
subject to some question. In Audenried v. East Coast Milling Co.,
decided in 1904, the New Jersey court held invalid a charter provision
that any resolution in writing signed by all the members of the board
of directors would constitute action by the board. This holding was
in the face of a New Jersey statute which provided that the incorporators might insert in the charter any provision they might choose for
the conduct of the affairs of the corporation or any provision creating,
defining, limiting, and regulating the powers of the directors, provided
the provision was not inconsistent with the corporation act. Among
other things, the Act provided that the business of every corporation
should be managed by its directors and that the secretary of a corporation should keep a record of the directors' votes.
Most modern courts quite likely would refuse to follow the Audentied decision. The reason frequently given for requiring formal action
by shareholders and directors, e.g., that in a duly called meeting a
minority has an opportunity to present their views and convince the
others, is not sufficiently strong to overcome the need for flexibility
in closely held corporations. In a number of decisions, even in the
absence of a statute or charter provision authorizing informal action,
acts of the directors without a meeting have been upheld. The courts
seem particularly inclined to uphold informal director action if the
directors have customarily acted informally. 179
176. In some Canadian provinces, British Columbia for instance, it is common practice to prepare minutes and mail them to shareholders or directors
who approve and sign them.
177. "The articles may provide that any director absent from a meeting may
be represented by any other director or shareholder, who may cast the vote

of the absent director according to the written instructions, general or special,

of said absent director." LA. REv. STAT. § 12:34 (1950).
178. 68 N.J. Eq. 450, 59 Atl. 577 (Ch. 1904), discussed p. 8 supra.
179. See Sharon Herald Co. v. Granger, 97 F. Supp. 295 (W.D. Pa. 1951):
Brainard v. De La Montanya, 18 Cal. 2d 502. 511, 116 P.2d 66 (1941); Gerard
v. Empire Square Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 244, 187 N.Y. Supp. 306 (2d Dep't
1921); Simonson v. Helburn, 198 Misc. 430, 97 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct.
1950). Mickshaw v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 166 Pa. Super. 148, 70 A.2d
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Several of the modern corporation acts permit, without regard to
provision in the charter, both the shareholders and directors to take
action informally by signing a written consent to the action. 180 Other
recent acts permit informal action by shareholders but do not contain
a provision authorizing such action by the directors181 and thus imply
182
that the directors cannot act informally.
A possible danger in allowing shareholders and directors to act
informally is that they may thereby lose the limited liability the corporate form ordinarily furnishes. Departures from corporate ritual may
lead some courts to say that the corporation is a mere "alter ego,"
"simulacrum" or "instrumentality" of the shareholders and that therefore they should be personally liable for its obligations. At least
enough of the formalities normally incident to corporate operation
should be maintained to insure that persons dealing with the enterprise clearly understand that they are dealing with a corporation and
not with the participants as individuals or partners.
One of the most important problems that faces the lawyer drafting
incorporation papers for a closely held corporation is to provide for
the resolution of stalemates. Deadlocks frequently occur among the
shareholders and in the directorates of closely held corporations.
Voting power is often so distributed that an eventual impasse is not
only possible but probable. The chance of corporaie paralysis is of
course increased if individual shareholders are given the power to
veto corporate decisions.'83
Neither the statutes nor the courts have provided a satisfactory
answer for the deadlock problem. 84 Whatever solution is to be had
must be in the incorporation papers or in shareholders' agreements. A
clause might be inserted in the charter providing'(1) that the corpo467 (1950).

"[A]ction, concurred in by all [the directors, who owned all the

shares], although separately, and not as a body, binds the corporation. We
must recognize the fact . . . that they [closed corporations] are, in perhaps
the majority of instances, conducted by officers and directors little informed
in the law of corporations, who often act informally, sometimes without
meetings or even by-laws. To hold that in all instances technical conformity
to the requirements of the law of corporations is a condition to a valid action

by the directors would be to lay down a rule of law which could be used as
a trap for the unwary who deal with corporations, and to permit corporations
sometimes to escape liability to which an individual in the same circumstances would be subjected." Gerard v. Empire Square Realty Co., 195 App.

Div. 244, 187 N.Y. Supp. 306, 310 (2d Dep't 1921).
180. E.g., PA. STAT. A.N. tit. 15, § 2852-402 (5) (Supp. 1955); Wis. STAT.
§ 180.91 (1955).
181. E.g., ILL. AN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.147 (Smith-Hurd 1954); MODEL BusINEss
CORPORATIONS ACT § 138.
182. In jurisdictions in which the board cannot act informally inconvenience
to the whole board can be avoided by setting up an executive committee with
authority to act for the board.
183. See p. 33 supra.

184. See Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corvorate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Cmi. L. REV. 778 (1952); De Capriles and Prunty,
Corporations,30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 534, 547 (1955).
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ration can be dissolved by the vote of one shareholder or the votes of
a small percentage of the shares,185 or (2) that any shareholder shall
have the power to dissolve the corporation unless the corporation or
the *othershareholders purchase his shares at a specified price or at a
price to be fixed by formula.18 Aside from the question of the legality
of provisions of this kind (and this is a serious question in jurisdictions with statutes which fix a stated vote for dissolutions), dissolution is hardly an acceptable answer if the business is prosperous or its
prospects promising. As there is ordinarily no ready market for a
minority interest in a closely held corporation, the breaking of a deadlock by some of the shareholders' selling out is usually not feasible. A
possibility worth considering is the use of a charter clause providing
that whenever the company becomes paralyzed by disagreements, an
option to purchase the shares of minority holders accrues in favor of
majority holders. Another possible solution is a charter provision for
the arbitration of disputes resulting in deadlock. 187
In drafting charter clauses for a closely held corporation, the lawyer
must keep in mind that most specimen clauses in the form books are
designed to meet the needs of public issue corporations and therefore
are not necessarily adapted to the problems of closely held corporations. Among the clauses that require special attention are those on
the shareholders' rights to inspect corporate records and those on
shareholders' preemptive rights.
Normally shareholders in a closely held corporation should be given
greater rights to inspect the corporate books and records than is customary in public issue corporations. As a matter of fact, statutory and
common law rights of inspection are not sufficient to meet the needs
of the shareholder in a closely held corporation, particularly in jurisdictions requiring the shareholder as a condition precedent to inspection to establish that his motives are not "ulterior." He should have an
unqualified right at all times (during corporate existence and after
dissolution) to examine personally or by representative all corporate
books, contracts, accounts, correspondence, memoranda and other
records, and to copy those documents and records. Further, consideration should be given to requiring the president or some specified
officer of the corporation to render on demand full information on all
corporate matters to any shareholder or to the legal representative of
185. "If it is desired to restrict any election to dissolve to the will of a
particular class or series of shares it is permissible to provide that only the
holders of that class or series of shares shall be entitled to vote on or consent
to any election to dissolve." Aspey, Suggestions and Precautions in Drafting
Articles of Incorporation,in ORGANIZING AND ADVISING SMALL BusINESS ENTERPRIsEs 162, 172 (Cal. Pract. Hand Book No. 2 1954).
186. See Winer, Proposing a New York "Close Corporation Law," 28
CORNELL L.Q. 313, 333, 342 (1943).
187. See O'Neal, Resolving Disputes in Closely Held Corporations: IntraInstitutional Arbitration, 67 HARv. L. REV. 786 (1954).
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any deceased shareholder or of any shareholder under legal disability.18 All of.this can be accomplished by charter provision.
The shareholder's right of inspection is especially important because
a closely held corporation is not subject to Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations, and often a closely held enterprise does not
even employ independent certified public accountants or, if it does, it
may limit the scope of their examination. Further, as shareholders in
a closely held enterprise are usually also officers, each shareholderofficer should be in a position to learn what is going on in those parts
of the business in which he is not personally engaged. At the same
time, there is really no reason in a closely held corporation to restrict
the right of inspection, because making records available to a few
shareholders is not much of a burden and the risk of snooping by
competitors is not great.
Similarly, preemptive rights of shareholders in a closely held corporation usually should not only be preserved but should be extended
and strengthened. For instance, preemptive rights should be made
applicable to stock issued for property as well as for money. This extension and strengthening of preemptive rights is in contrast with the
practice in public issue corporations, where preemptive rights ordinarily are taken aways or limited. 189
Most of the considerations that justify the elimination of preemptive
rights in public corporations do not apply to. closely held corporations,
at least not to those with simple share structures. Preemptive rights
may be a source of insoluble difficulties in a corporation with a complex share structure. In addition, a corporation with stock publicly
held may often want to sell shares to officers or employees as an incentive, or it may want to purchase the assets of another business with
shares of its own stock; obtaining the waiver of preemptive rights
might be impractical in these situations. Preemptive rights do not
create these problems in a closely held corporation. Preemptive rights
are needed in a closely held corporation to protect the shareholder's
proportionate interest in control, dividends and surplus. A shareholder's interest in a closely held corporation is likely to be proportionately greater than the individual interest of a shareholder in a
public issue corporation. Usually the proportionate interest of a shareholder in a public issue corporation is insignificant to begin with, and
therefore an increase in stock makes little difference to him; and if it
does, he can buy additional shares on the market.
Control is more important to a shareholder in a closely held corporation than to one in a public corporation, because control in a closely
188. See Winer, Proposing A New York "Close Corporation Law," 28

COR ELL L.Q. 313, 341 (1943).

189. See p. 31 supra.
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held corporation means employment, and the loss of control may result in termination of employment. Issuance of new stock to some
shareholders but not to others may throw out of balance an otherwise
carefully formulated plan distributing control among the various
participants.
A final reason for maintaining preemptive rights in a closely held
corporation is that its growth is likely to be due largely to the energy
and personality of its shareholders. Therefore they should be in a
position to purchase new issues of the corporation's stock and thus
share in its expansion and prosperity.
Preemptive rights may not fully protect a shareholder against dilution of his interest in the corporation because when new stock is
issued he may not have the funds to exercise his rights. Thus, a lawyer
preparing incorporation papers for a closely held corporation should
consider alternative methods of protecting shareholders against that
risk, e.g., the use of a charter clause prohibiting without the unanimous
consent of the shareholders any increase in the amount of capital stock
or any allotment or reissuance of stock.
C. Clauses That Might Strengthen Democratic Processes in Corporate
Government.
Charter provisions can probably be drafted which would strengthen
democratic processes in the government of large corporations. 1 0 The
charter, for instance, might require the dissemination of a great deal
more information to the shareholders than is now the practice. It
might require (1) the directors to furnish the shareholders at periodic
intervals a complete report including certified financial statements and
other relevant information; 191 (2) the secretary of the corporation to
furnish the names and addresses of all shareholders on request from
the holders of a stated percentage of the shares; and (3) the secretary
of the corporation to prepare and mail to each shareholder within a
reasonable time after each shareholders' meeting a sort of post-meeting
report containing a transcript of the proceedings of the meeting. Pro190. Trigger, Corporate Democracy ... Advantages to Management, 4 DiCTA
61 (1952-53), points out that corporations and their managements may benefit
from expanded corporate democracy. He notes that observance of democratic
processes by a corporation results in improved relations with the shareholders
and the concomitant advantages of (1) a ready-made and receptive market
for new stock issues. (2) a tremendous advertising program through word-ofmouth advertising by shareholders, and (3) an independent and effective
lobby, working with management, for legislation favorable to the free enterprise system.
191. See CAL. CoRP. CODE ANN. § 3006 (Deering 1953). Under the corporate
reorganization subchapter of the Bankruptcy Act, a reorganization plan for a
corporation with an indebtedness of $250,000 or more must provide for inclusion in the reorganized company's charter of "provisions with respect to
the making, not less than once annually, of periodic reports to security holders
which shall include profit and loss statements and balance sheets prepared in
accordance with sound business and accounting practice." 52 STAT. 895 (1938);
11 U.S.C. § 616 (12) (b) (1952).
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vision could also be made for the preparation of separate statements
by minority directors on issues on which they differ with the majority
and for the distribution of these minority statements with annual
or other periodic reports. Further, the establishment of regional
meetings of shareholders would give shareholders in all parts of the
country an opportunity to speak with company officials and ask them
questions firsthand. In those jurisdictions in which cumulative voting
for directors is not made mandatory by constitutional provision or
by statute, a clause in the charter requiring cumulative voting is
needed to give minority shareholders representation on the board and
the information and protection against abuse that goes along with
representation.
Other charter clauses that might be considered are provisions (1)
strengthening and safeguarding the shareholders' preemptive rights
so that they will be in a position to maintain their proportionate
ownership in the corporation, (2) requiring directors to be shareholders, (3) requiring directors to attend a specified percentage of
directors' meetings or forfeit their offices, (4) limiting the amount the
corporation can spend in soliciting its own proxies, and (5) providing
for the payment by the corporation of the reasonable expenses of a
192
shareholder group that wins a contest with the management.
PRECAUTIONS THAT INcREASE THE EFFEcTIvENEss OF
OPTIONAL CLAUSES
The draftsman can take a number of measures that will increase the
effectiveness of optional provisions and protect them against attack or
circumvention. The more important of these precautions are discussed
in the following paragraphs.
A. Necessity of Careful, Individualized Drafting.
Most optional provisions require careful, individualized drafting.
Optional provisions should mold the corporate device to the needs of
a particular business enterprise, and of course no two business situations are exactly alike. Clauses in standard form books can at most
serve only as "idea guides,"'9 3 and specimen provisions on many
matters that an imaginative draftsman might want to cover are simply
not available in published form. Further, because of differences in the
corporation statutes and in the attitudes of the courts in the various
states, optional provisions useful in one state may not be satisfactory
192. The provision might go farther and require the corporation to reimburse
any group of shareholders for printing and mailing expenses if they should
succeed in electing one or more directors or if a resolution they proposed received over a stipulated percentage of the vote cast. Israels, Corporate Democracy ...FundamentalElements, 4 DICTA 11, 15 (1952-53), suggests that a
statute requiring the corporation to reimburse such expenses might be desirable.
193. See PANTZER AND O'NEAL, THE DRAFTING OF CORPORATE CHARTERS AND
BY-LAws §§ 2.03-2.04 (1951).
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in another. Thus, in many situations,, there are no specimen clauses
tested by long use and by judicial scrutiny for the draftsman to use.
The necessity of thoughtful and careful drafting cannot be overemphasized.19 In some instances, loosely drawn optional provisions
have been interpreted so as to frustrate the intention of the draftsman,
in fact to accomplish just the reverse of what he intended. 195 The
draftsman must check carefully to see that the optional provisions
that he uses tie in with the "boiler plate" in the charter. Courts consider a charter in its entirety, looking at all the language of the charter
in determining the meaning to be given any portion of it.'9
Sometimes the form of the language in which a clause is couched
(rather than its substance or effect) will determine whether or not
197
it will be sustained. Thus, in Aldridge v. Franco Wyoming Oil Co.,

a Delaware court held invalid a clause in the charter which provided
that no person should be elected a director against whom there should
be cast the vote of 40% of the Class A stock; although under the Delaware statute, there was clear authority for obtaining the same result
by wording the clause to give a specified percentage of the Class A
shares "an affirmative right to express a choice or preference, not
merely the right of negation."
B. Obtaining Unanimous'Consent to Uiusual Charter Provisions.
The risk that an unorthodox charter provision will be declared invalid is probably increased by dissent at the time of its adoption. Some
courts may well be willing to sustain clauses which deviate from the
normal corporate pattern if those clauses are consented to by all interested persons, but may be unwilling to sanction departures if there
are dissenters. 198 There seems to be a tendency for courts to conclude
that shareholders by unanimous consent can do as they please with
the corporation as long as the rights of creditors are not prejudiced.
Further, at least one court has refused to enforce against dissenting
shareholders a charter amendment which it held to be binding on
consenting shareholders. 199
194. The validity of clauses in corporate charters has been said to be determined "not by what has been done under them, but also by what may be
done." Kaplan v. Block, 183 Va. 327, 31 S.E.2d 893 (1944).
195. See Martin Foundation v. North American Rayon Corp., 68 A.2d 313
(Del. Ch. 1949) (charter provision which defined disqualifying interest of directors for quorum purposes interpreted so as to place broader disqualifications
on directors than would have existed at common law).
196. See Ellingwood v. Wolf's Head Oil Refining Co., 38 A.2d 743 (Del. 1944).
197. 24 Del. Ch. 349, 14 A.2d 380 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
198. Differences in treatment are discernible between unanimous shareholders' agreements and contracts entered into by less than all the shareholders.
Compare Matter of American Fibre Chair Seat Corp., 265 N.Y. 416, 193 N.E. 253
(1934); Kassel v. Empire Tinware Co., 178 App. Div. 176, 164 N.Y. Supp. 1033
(2d Dep't 1917), with McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323, 189 N.E. 234
(1934); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313, 119 N.E. 559 (1918).
199. See Albrecht, Maguire & Co. v. General Plastics, 256 App. Div. 134, 9
N.Y.S.2d 415 (4th Dep't), aff"d mere., 280 N.Y. 840, 21 N.E.2d 887 (1939) (an
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When a corporation is being formed, the participants- can usually
agree on what provisions -to include:in the charter. That is,
the preferable time to place optional clauses in the charter. Later, a proposal to
insert a provision in the charter is much more likely to meet with
objection. The lawyer should be especially cautious in amending .a
charter to insert an unorthodox provision over the -dissent of minority
shareholders. Further, rights may be acquired, under an originqal ,char-:
ter that cannot be divested by charter amendment. For example, a
charter amendment authorizing the removal or suspension of directors
has been held ineffective to support the removal of a director in office
200
at the time of the amendment.
C. Protecting Optional Charter Provisions Against Repeal or Circumvention.
Many of the optional clauses used in corporate charters (such as
provisions giving a shareholder a power to veto corporate decisions and
provisions setting up cumulative voting or granting preemptive rights)
are designed to benefit minority shareholders. Special care, must be
taken to safeguard clauses of this kind against repeal, amendment or
circumvention by manipulations of majority shareholders.
Modern corporation acts provide for, amendment of corporate charters by a vote of a specified percentage of the shareholders. In some
jurisdictions, the votes of holders of a simple majority of shares with
voting power are sufficient. Thus, majority shareholders who find their
wishes frustrated by charter provisions granting rights to minority
shareholders may resort to the relatively simple expedient of amend201
ing the charter.
In many jurisdictions, charter provisions can be protected against
amendment by inserting in the charter a clause requiring unanimity
or a high vote for charter -amendment.2 02 Most corporation acts
amendment to the 'certificate of incorporation cutting off shareholders' preemptive rights was effective to deprive consenting shareholders of their preemptive but did not bind shareholders who opposed the amendment).
200. Petition of Singer, 70 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
201. See Silva v. Coastal Plywood & Timber Co., 124 Cal. App. 2d 276, 268
P.2d 510 (1954) (charter restrictions on transfer of shares validly removed
by charter amendment pursuant to Nevada statute); Maddock v. Vorclone
Corporation, 17 Del. Ch. 39, 147 Atl. 255 (Ch. 1929) (cumulative voting provision in charter validly eliminated from the charter by a simple majority
vote as in other charter amendments). But see Bechtold v. Coleman Realty
Co., 367 Pa. 208, 79 A.2d 661 (1951) (by-law restriction on transfer of shares
creates "vested rights" and cannot be amended without unanimous consent).
202. The safest approach is to require unanimity or a high vote to amend
or repeal any charter amendment rather than to limit the high vote requirement to particular clauses. A particular charter clause can sometimes be circumvented by amending other provisions of the charter. Thus, a provision
designed to give a shareholder a power to veto action 'by the directors can
under some circumstances be frustrated by increasing the number of directors.
There is also a danger that a particular charter provision requiring a high
vote for specified charter amendments may itself be amended or repealed by
a smaller vote. See Sellers v. Bancroft & Sons Co., 23 Del. Ch. 13, 2- A.2d 108

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 10

authorize unanimity or high vote requirements for charter amendment.2 3 In some jurisdictions, however, a charter clause setting the
vote for charter amendments higher than the statutory vote fixed for
amendments might be held invalid. In those jurisdictions, it may be
possible to guard against charter amendment by an agreement not to
amend among the shareholders or by an agreement between the company and the shareholders.m
The lawyer also has to guard against the possibility that in exceptional situations an amendment of the by-laws will supersede a clause
in the charter. In Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp.,20 5 the court
held that the Delaware statute makes the by-laws the controlling
authority on the number of directors a corporation shall have and
that a charter provision fixing the number of directors is superseded
by a subsequent by-law increasing the number of directors.
The rights conferred on minority shareholders by special charter
provisions may also be lost through the merger or consolidation of the
corporation; or shareholders attempting to exercise their rights may
be "frozen out" by the dissolution of the corporation and the formation of a new corporation without the minority shareholders or by the
transfer of all or substantially all the corporation's assets to another
company. The answer to this problem is to require approval of all
or of a very high percentage of the shares for fundamental corporate
acts such as merger, consolidation, capital increase or reduction, dissolution and the transfer of all corporate assets.
D. Deciding Whether to Place Provisions in Charter or in Some
Other Instrument.
Before including optional provisions in a corporate charter, the
lawyer preparing incorporation papers for a corporate client must
weigh the advantages and disadvantages of alternative methods of
accomplishing the desired objective. He must determine, for instance,
whether to put a particular provision in the charter, in the by-laws,
in a shareholders' agreement, or in two or more of those instruments.
This decision is often difficult.
(Oh. 1938); cf. Warren v. 536 Broad St. Corp., 6 N.J. Super. 170, 70 A.2d 782

(App. Div. 1950).
203. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 304 (1938).

§ 242 (1953); N.Y.

STOCK

COR'. LAW

§ 37;

204. "Moreover, the statutory right of holders of a majority of voting stock
to amend the certificate of incorporation so as to increase the number of directors is absolute unless restricted by some contrary provision in the cer-

tificate of incorporation or unless prohibited by unanimous written agree-

ment of all the stockholders." Christal v. Petry, 275 App. Div. 550, 90 N.Y.S.2d
620, 627 (1st Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 301 N.Y. 562, 93 N.E.2d 450 (1950). In
British Murac Syndicate, Ltd. v. Alperton Rubber Co., [1915] 2 Ch. 186, the
court restrained a company from violating a contract not to alter its articles
of association, the contract having been entered into by the company and a
syndicate holding some of its stock.
205. 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 Atl. 136 (Oh. 1933).
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The corporation act or judicial decisions in a jurisdiction may dictate the document in which a particular clause must be placed. In
some jurisdictions, the act clearly states that a specified type of provision may be inserted in the charter but makes no clear provision for
its inclusion in the by-laws; in other jurisdictions, the act authorizes
the use of a clause in the by-laws but does not mention inclusion in
the charter. 2 6
In some states, the part of the corporation act which lists items for
inclusion in the charter is couched in language that lends some support
to an argument that matters there authorized for coverage in optional
charter clauses cannot be covered by a by-law provision or in a shareholders' agreement. Thus, the Maryland statute provides that the
articles of incorporation "shall state-* * * (7) the restrictions, if
any, imposed upon the transferability of shares of any class."2 0 7 Statutory language of this kind could conceivably be interpreted to mean
that share restrictions elsewhere would be ineffective.
That a draftsman cannot safely assume that statutory authority to
place a particular clause in the by-laws will also sustain the clause
if it is placed in the charter is illustrated by the Delaware case of
Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp. 20 8 In that case, although the
charter fixed the number of directors at nine, the shareholders
amended the by-laws to increase the number to fifteen. The question
before the court was whether the principle of graduated authority
(i.e., that the statute is supreme over the charter, the charter over the
by-laws, and so forth) rendered ineffective the attempted increase in
the number of directors. The court gave effect to the change, basing
its decision on a statute which provided that the "number of directors
206. For instance, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-2 (1939) provides that the "power to
make and alter by-laws shall be in the stockholders, but any corporation may,
in the certificate of incorporation, confer that power on the directors;" while
N.Y. GEN.CORP.LAW § 27 provides that "Subject to the by-laws.., the board
may make necessary by-laws." Similarly, the statutes of some states permit
provisions to be made in the by-laws for the indemnification of directors for
liabilities incurred by reason of service with the corporation. CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 5129 (1949); R.I. Acts 1948, c. 2154. Other statutes permit in addition
the inclusion of such provisions in other corporate documents, such as the
charter, or a certificate filed pursuant to law, an amendment to one of these,

or a resolution in a specific case. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. c. 49, § 23 (1954);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 14:3-14 (Supp. 1944); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAW § 63. "The
board of directors may exercise all the powers of a corporation, except such
as are conferred by law, or by the by-laws of the corporation, upon the stockholders." MAss. GEN. LAWS c. 156, § 6 (1932). Many corporation statutes provided that the duties of corporate officers may be fixed by the by-laws. See,
e.g., UNIFORM BusINEss CORPORATIONS ACT § 32(111); Wyoivi. CoMP. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-116 (1945). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (1953) provides the corporate

officers may be chosen by the directors or stockholders as the by-laws may
direct.
207. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 4 (1951). ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.311 (1953) provides: "(1) The articles of incorporation shall set forth: * * * (g) Any pro-

vision limiting or denying to shareholders the preemptive right to acquire additional or treasury shares of the corporation."

208. 165 Atl. 136 (Del. Ch. 1933).
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which shall constitute the whole board shall be such as from time, to
time shall be fixed.by, or in the manner provided in the by-laws" 2 ?
The court concluded that the statute was mandatory and made the
by-laws the sole and exclusive repository of the power to fix and alter
the number of directors. The court stated that the "by-laws take their
superior authority over the charter in this particular matter because
they operate under the superior mandate of the statute."210 Qn the
other hand, in Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph Co.,2 11 a Delaware
court held valid a charter clause giving the shareholders 4nd directors
power to hold corporate meetings outside of Delaware, even -though
the Delaware ,corporation statute stated that "meetings may be held
outside of the state if the by-laws so provide."
Whenever a distinction is made in judicial decisions in the validity
of a particular clause, depending on whether it is in the charter or in
the by-laws, the charter clause is usually sustained and the by-law
invalidated. 212 Thus, in New York) the courts have held invalid a bylaw which provided that the number of directors could not be
increased or diminished by a vote pf less than 90 percent of the shareholders,21 3 but have sustained a clause in the, certificate of incorporation which provided that the number of directors fixed by the
certificate could not be changed except with the unanimous consent
of the shareholders. 214 Similarly, in some jurisdictions, restrictions on
209. 36 Del Laws 1929, c. 135 § 4.
210. 165 Atl. at 141. See also Reen v. United States Cement Co., 36 Ind.
App. 149, 73 N.E. 269, 271 (1905). The first sentence of Or. REV. STAT. §
57.200 (1953) is rather oddly worded. It refers to a 'majority of the number of
directors fixed by the by-laws, or in the absence of a by-law fixing the number
of directors, then of the number stated in the articles of incorporation."
211. 11 Del. Ch. 190, 98 Ati. 943 (Ch. 1916); 11 Del. Ch. 412, 102 Atl. 988
(Sup. Ct. 1918).
212. "The difference between a restraint upon alienating the shares in these
associations, contained in the article, which must receive the assent of all
the primary shareholders and by which all persons holding derivative interest must be bound, and a like restraint imposed by the agents of the association in the form of a by-law, which may or may not come to the knowledge of the, shareholders, and which, if known, may be disapproved of by
them, is very marked. A person may generally agree by express contract to
any qualification of his rights of property not repugnant to the rules of law;
but if another person undertakes to attach such qualifications in his behalf,
he must show his authority for the act." Bank of Attica v. Manufacturers and
Traders' Bank, 20 N.Y. 501, 505-06 (1859).
213. Katz v. H. & H. Mfg. Co., 109 App. Div. 49, 95 N.Y. Supp. 663 (1st Dep't
1905), aff'd mem., 183 N.Y. 578, 76 N.E. 1098 (1906). See also Bond v. Atlantic
Mercantile Co., 137 App. Div. 671, 122 N.Y. Supp. 426 (1st Dep't 1910).
214. Ripin v. United States Woven Label Co., 71 Misc. 510, 145 App. Div.
916, 130 N.Y. Supp. 20 (1st Dep't 1911), aft'd, 205 N.Y. 442, 98 N.E, 850 (1912),
discussed p. 10 supra. "Moreover, the statutory right of holders of a
majority of voting stock to amend the certificate of incorporation so as to increase the number of directors is absolute unless restricted by some contrary
provision in the certificate of incorporation or unless prohibited by unanimous
written agreement of all the stockholders. Any by-law attempting to restrict
such right is ineffectual and invalid." Christal v. Petry, 275 App. Div. 550,
90 N.Y.S.2d 620 (lst Dep't 1949), aff'd mem., 301 N.Y. 562, 93 N.E.2d 450 (1950).
But cf. In re Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N.Y. Supp,
430, 432 (1st Dep't 1921) ("It is true that the foregoing cases had reference
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the transferability of stock are somewhat less likely to be -sustained
215
if placed in the by-law than if placead in:tlie charter.
Sometimes the lawyer will find that courts ir a jiftisdiction have
upheld a particular clause in one instrumeit- 2 .either in the dharter,
in the by-laws or a shareholders' contracj-_' 6 'but that they hai.e not
passed on whether the same clause can be used in other, instruments
aind- have not giveri any clear indicatibn -of how they wotild, hold if
that ques'tioi 'hould4 arise. U(nddr such ,circumitanes; the. lavvyr nfay
be wise to Use'the "aipoved inistrumerit.
Many' 'corporation statutes, includixg most' of "th" imore" modern
ones, clearly specify some matters tlat may be included-in either
the charter or the by-laws. Perhaps representative of the type of
statutory provision that gives the draftsman a clear choice is a
section of the Oregon' statute which provides that the "act. of the
majorityo of the directors present at a 'Meeting at which a qudrum is
preient shall be the act'6f the bloarid of directors, unless the a~t df a
greater number is required by the articles of incorporation or the
by-1Aws. ''217 Statutes givin'a choice, however, are worded in a great
variety of ways.218 Sometimes a statutory section provides that specified' matters may be covered in thid charter but states that other
specified matters may be covered in either the'charter or the bylaws. 21 9 Othe F , statutes grant a general authority to include provisions
in the by-law:s , usinig arigtiage quite"similar'to that used in some
statutes: to authorize .optional. provisiofis in the charter. The Missouri statute, for instance, provides that "the by-laws may contain
any provisions for the regulation and management of the affairs
of the corporation not inconsistent with law or with the articles of
incorporation."2 20 A few statutes provide that the charter may contain
"any provision which would be authorized to be included in the bylaws."2 2' Thus, in most states, there Will be reasonably firm legal
authority fbr including a considerable number of clauses in either
the charter or the by-laws, and the draftsmin mus't -weigh the respective advantages and disadvantages of the two before deciding in
to by-laws, and not to provisions [requiring directors to be elected by unanimous consent6f shareholders] embodied in a certificate of incorporation.. But
the reasoning of those cases is likewise' applicable to a certificate 'ofin:corporation").
215. See In re Laun, 146 Wis. 252, 254, 131 N.W. 366, 367 (1911); Comment,
18 IowA L. RE V. 88 (1932).

216. ,See Leventhal v. Atlantic Finance Corp., 316 Mass. 194, 55 N.E.2d 20,
154 A.L.R. 260 (1944) (holding that the right given a shareholder by Massachusetts statute under specified conditions to petition for dissolution may be
waived by contract).
217. ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.200 (1953).
218. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd 1954); N.Y. GE q.
CORP. LAw § 63; Omo REv. CODE ANw. § 1701.65(B) (C) (Baldwin 1953).
219. See, e.g., Ono REV. CODE AN . § 1701.63 (Baldwin 1953).
220. Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.290 (1949).

221. See, e.g., M. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 4(c) (1951).
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which instrument to place the provisions.
A number of practical considerations must be kept in mind in
making the choice. A charter is a public instrument and is generally
open to public inspection while by-laws are not. The by-laws can
usually be amended or repealed more easily and more quickly and
As charter provisions are
with less expense than can the charter.
relatively difficult of repeal and amendment, the charter ordinarily
contains only provisions which are expected to be fairly permanent
or which are designed to protect minority shareholders. Most matters
of internal management are covered in the by-laws, because those
matters should be subject to hasty change.
Many draftsmen consider it to be good practice to repeat in the
by-laws some items covered in the charter, because the by-laws serve
as a guide for the directors and corporate officers (especially the
secretary) in the conduct of corporate activities. Repeating unusual
charter clauses in the by-laws serves to keep directors and officers
from forgetting or overlooking them.
Some statutes require the use of both charter and by-law provisions
to achieve a desired result. A Rhode Island statute, for instance, states
that the articles of incorporation may provide that the corporation
"shall have a lien on all shares of a stockholder for assessments due
from him or other indebtedness of the stockholder due to the corporation, enforcible in such manner as the by-laws shall provide.2 2
Other statutes contemplate that specified matters may be covered in
the by-laws if authority to do so is given in the charter.224 Even in
the absence of a statutory requirement, the draftsman may use both
a charter provision and a by-law to achieve a particular result, setting forth the matter in a general way in the charter but providing
flexibility by leaving details or limitations to be spelled out in the
more easily amended by-laws. 225 Similarly, he may use a provision in
the charter that will tie in with, lay the foundation for, or help
effectuate a shareholders' agreement or by-law. 226 Even though the
222. In some states, shareholders can amend the by-laws but not the chapter
without obtaining approval of the directors. See Gow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 165 Atl. 136, 142 (Del. Ch. 1933).
223. R. I. Gm.N. LAws ANN. c. 116, § 8 (1938). See also KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-2803(H) (1949) (authorizing a charter clause setting forth the
manner of adopting, altering and repealing by-laws).
224. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 180.32 (1955) ("The number of directors may be
fixed by the articles of incorporation, or, if the articles of incorporation so
provide, by the by-laws .... ").
225. A charter provision sometimes used is worded somewhat as follows:
"The board of directors of the corporation is hereby empowered to authorize
the issuance from time to time of shares of its stock, with or without par
value, of any class, and securities convertible into shares of its stock, with
or without par value, of any class, for such considerations the board of directors may deem advisable, irrespective of the value or amount of such considerations, but subject to such limitations and restrictions, if any, as may be
set forth in the by-laws of the corporation."
226. The following is a charter clause of that type: "If (a) any two or more
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lawyer does not plan to cover a particular item in the charter, he
should at the time he drafts the charter give thought to what instrument he will use and how he will word the provision; otherwise he
may find that he has not laid a proper foundation in the charter for
covering the matter in another instrument and is precluded from
doing so without a charter amendment.
Some draftsmen prefer to use shareholders' agreements rather
than (or in supplement to)227 charter provisions to cover many
matters, such as restrictions on the transferability of stock and the
allocation of control among the various participants; and in many
localities matters of that kind are nearly always covered by agreement among the shareholders rather than by charter provision. The
principal reasons for this are probably the bulkiness of some of the
provisions and the uncertainty of the draftsmen as to whether such
matters can properly be covered in the charter.2 8 Perhaps too the
fact that the charter is a public document tends to discourage the
inclusion in it of some items. On the other hand, a few draftsmen use
stockholders or subscribers to stock of the corporation shall enter into any
agreement abridging, limiting or restricting the rights of any one or more of
them to sell, assign, transfer, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate or transfer on the

books of the corporation, any or all of the stock of the corporation held by

them, and if a copy of said agreement shall be filed with the corporation, or if
(b) the incorporators or the stockholders entitled to vote shall adopt any

provision of by-laws abridging, limiting or restricting the aforesaid rights of
any stockholders, then and in either of such events, all certificates of stock
subject to such abridgements, limitations or restrictions shall have a reference
thereto endorsed thereon by an officer of the corporation and such stock

shall not thereafter be transferred on the books of the corporation except

in accordance with the terms and provisions of such agreement or by-laws, as
the case may be."
227. "The best procedure would be to place arbitration clauses in both
a pre-incorporation agreement and in the charter." William H. Neiman,
Proceedings at the Annual Meeting of the Section of Corporation,Banking
and Business Law (Chicago, August 16-17, 1954), 10 BuswNEss LAw. Nov. 1954,

p. 9, 38. For reasons for covering restrictions on the transfer of stock both
in a pre-incorporation agreement and in the charter, see O'Neal, Restrictions
on Transfer of Stock in Closely Held Corporations:Planning and Drafting,

65 HARv. L. REv.773, 786-88 (1952).

228. Typical of the kind of provisions found in shareholders' agreements
but considered by most draftsmen as inappropriate matter for the charter are
the following clauses: "The shareholders shall at all times vote their shares so
that:
(A) The Boaid of Directors shall consist of six members, and two persons
nominated by A, two persons nominated by B, and two persons nominated by C shall at all times be directors of the corporation so long
as A, B and C hold stock in the corporation;
(B) A, B and C shall be President, Vice-President and Vice-President,
respectively, of the corporation so long as said persons hold stock,
are active in the business, are reasonably able to perform and do
perform their duties, and make the management thereof their principal
business occupation; and
(C) Said persons, as officers, shall be compensated at the ratio of one and
one-third to one to one (1-1/3:1:1) respectively, until December 31,
1975, and thereafter equally."
Quotation of the above provisions here is not meant to imply that they are
valid or specifically enforcible, even if incorporated in a shareholders' agreement to which all shareholders are parties. Provisions of this kind, however, are commonly placed in shareholders' agreements.
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lengthy. and .detailed':and even: "personalized" provisions in the
charter, .ahd whenvthose-prpvisions -havecbrne before. the ourts .they
have,usually been upheldA291
"A-refefenceto any unusual or unqrthodox. charter, proviSion should
be placed on-each certificate- of stock. Reference t&,certain types of
charter provisions on each certificate is expressly required by statutes.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides that there "shall be no
lien in favor of a corporatiomupon the shares reprbsented by a certificatel. . . and there s.hall be no restriction upon the transfer of shares so
represented by virtue of any by-law of such corporation to such lien
unless the restriction is-stated' upon' the certificate." 23° Similarly, notice
of 'the high quorum and high vote requirements for -shareholder and
dfrector-.action authorized by Section'9 of the New York Stock Corporation 'ActV' must appear clearly, on the stock certificates.=
Reference to an unusual charter provision should be made in stock
certiflcates even if that -is -not required by statute. Although purchasers of stock are sometimes said to be presumed to have knowledge .of what is in the charter, courts are,much more likely to hold
'a purchaser of shares bound by an uhusual charter provision if he
actually, knew., of it.
or had an opportunity to learn of it before he
2
purchased his shares. 3
Conclusion
The lawyer drafting a corporate charter never approaches his task
with a pristine mind. He sees his problem through the patterns and
ways of thinking which prevail in his legal community. What he
has done in the past in drafting charters and ,what, his colleagues at
the bar are now doing-shape his thinking. and limit 'his conduct. In
other words, he is a creature of his legal culture; OnoI in lorge part
its practices are his practices, its methods his methods, and its impossibilities his impossibilities. Perhaps' this partially explains the
dull "sameness" of most corporate charters, which. is in such sharp
229, See p. 37 supra.
230. UNIFORV STOCK TRANSFER ACT § 15. The Uniform Stock Transfer Act
was adopted by all the states, but section 15 was deleted in two states and
materially modified in two others. In spite of section 15, some cases have
held that restrictions which had not been placed on the share qertificates were
nevertheless effective against persons with notice of the restrictions. Doss v.
Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 .(1930); Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95

N.J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (Ch. 1924).
231. See discussion of-that statute, p. 4 supra.

232. See also N.Y. STOCK CoRP. LAW § 65; N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW

§ 176.

233. See Union Trust Co. v. Carter, 139 Fed. 717, 719 ,(C.C.W.D. Va. 1905);
Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 152 Atl. 723, 729 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1930). A
New York court held invalid as "contrary to public policy" clauses in the
certificate of incorporation which required a unanimous votefof shareholders
toi-elect directors, "since it may work a fraud upon the public who may purchase such shares in ignorance of the certificate provisions in question." In re
Boulevard Theatre & Realty Co., 195 App. Div. 518, 186 N.Y. Supp. 430, 433
(1st Dep't 1921), a-f'd mem., 231 N.Y. 615, 132 N.E. 910 (1921).
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contrast with the uniqueness and individuality of business enterprises and the infinite variety of their needs.
Whatever the reason, most draftsmen do not utilize the considerable
freedom that modern corporation acts give them to mold the corporate device to the varying needs of American business enterprises.
An examination of charters now in use shows that most of them fail
even to clear up uncertainties and "trouble spots" that in the past have
proved fertile sources of litigation. 23 A lawyer drafting corporate
charters can by the use of optional clauses often clarify legal relationships in those shadowy areas in which the law is uncertain or provides
no answer to problems or difficulties that can easily be anticipated.
Further, by the use of optional charter clauses he can mold the corporate form until it is ideally suited to almost any business enterprise.
If there is a business need for particular provisions to be included in
the charter and the lawyer does not explore thoroughly the possibility of including those provisions, he is not adequately serving his
client. By looking beyond the incorporation practices of his own
locality, to see what is being done elsewhere, and by directing his
thinking into fresh channels, the lawyer can often increase the usefulness of the corporate organization to the clients he serves.
234. See Hayes, Authorization and Issuance of Capital Stock by the Iowa
Corporation (Part II of a Study of Iowa Incorporation Practices), °39 IOWA L.
REv. 608, 634 (1954). "Judging by the articles examined, some recognize their
opportunity and do take care of many of the uncertainties. A number, however, have not done this, and their articles contain seeds of future litigation
which they well could have destroyed." Hayes, Stockholders' Rights in the
Iowa Corporation (Part IV of a Study of Iowa Incorporation Practices), 40
IOWA L. REV. 459, 486 (1955).
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